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Will and Order in the Nation-State System: Observations on Positivism and Positive International Law*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

Maarten Bos
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Extract

There are two ways to study positivism in international law. Firstly, one may describe doctrinal utterances and judicial pronouncements in which a positivist attitude towards international law is revealed. Secondly, one may offer one's own view of law generally, and of international law in particular, and, on that basis, try to define to what extent, if any, international law appears to be founded in man's sovereign will.

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Articles
Information
Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , May 1982 , pp. 3 - 31
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1982

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References

1. ProfessorTunkin, Grigory I., “Soviet Theory of Sources of International Law”, in Völkerrecht und Rechtsphilosophie (Festschrift Verosta) (Berlin, 1980) p. 69Google Scholar, claims “the leading Soviet theory of the co-ordination of the wills of states” to be a new theory, but fails to prove his case.

2. See his article on “The Recognized Manifestations of International Law: A New Theory of “Sources””, German Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 20 (1977) p. 38Google Scholar.

3. ICJ Reports, 1969 pp. 38–39 (para. 63).

4. ICJ Reports, 1974 p. 268 (para. 46).

5. ICJ Reports, 1950 p. 138.

6. Ibid., 1954 p. 61.

7. Ibid., 1971 p. 264.

8. Ibid., 1969 p. 21 (para. 17).

9. See “Principles of Rational Organization as Applied in the Process of Law”, Essays on International Law and Relations in Honour of A.J.P. Tammes (Leyden, 1977) pp. 43–54Google Scholar.

10. Ibid., p. 43.

11. Ibid., p. 44.

12. Ibid., p. 45.

13. Ibid., pp. 44–45.

14. Schwarzenberger, Georg, “The Province of the Doctrine of International Law”, Current Legal Problems, 1956 p. 254Google Scholar. And comp. de Visscher, Charles, “Cours général de principes de droit international public”, Recueil de I'Académie de Droit International, 1954-II p. 469Google Scholar.

15. “Dominant Interests in International Law”, in Estudios de Derecho International: Homenaje a Don Antonio de Luna, Revista Espanola de Derecho International, 1968 pp. 227–244 (in the volume under the same title: pp. 79–96).

16. Ibid., pp. 229–230 (81–82).

17. Comp. this writer's “Old Germanic Law Analogies in International Law, or: The State as homo liber”, Netherlands International Law Review, 1978 pp. 51–62; also in Mélanges Fernand Dehousse, Vol. I (Les progrès du droit des gens) (Paris-Brussels, 1979) pp. 25–30Google Scholar.

18. See this writer, “Recognized Manifestations” p. 44.

19. This writer touched upon the need for a philosophy of history in a number of previous publications. See “Self-Determination by the Grace of History”, Netherlands International Law Review, 1968 pp. 362–373; “Friede durch Völkerrecht – oder durch Völkerlegitimität?”, ibid. 1970 pp. 113–125; and “Principles of Rational Organization” (quoted supra n. 9) pp. 48–49. And comp. lately Messner, Johannes, “Völkerrechtslehre und Geschichtsphilosophie”, in Internationale Festschrift für Alfred Verdross (Munich-Salzburg, 1971) pp. 293–308Google Scholar.

20. ICJ Reports, 1951 p. 128.

21. ICJ Reports, 1969 p. 47 (para. 85).

22. See n.2.

23. “Recognized Manifestations” p. 59.

24. Comp. lately Zoller, Elisabeth, La bonne foi en droit international public (Paris, 1977)Google Scholar. In the present writer's opinion, estoppel and acquiescence belong under the heading of good faith.

25. Comp. this writer's “Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation”, NILR, 1980 pp. 20–22 (on the character of the rules and methods of interpretation).

26. See Basdevant, J., Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international (Paris, 1960) pp. 91–92Google Scholar.

27. de Visscher, Charles, op.cit., p. 540: “l'équité (est) cette forme de la justice qui répond exactement aux particularités d'un cas concret”Google Scholar.

28. See, e.g., ProfessorTelders, B.M., “Opzet van een boek over het international recht” (Sketch of a Book on International Law), in Verzamelde Geschriften (Collected Papers), Vol. III (The Hague, 1948) p. 338Google Scholar. The book never materialized on account of the author's untimely death.

29. See Cheng, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London, 1953) pp. 20 and 261Google Scholar, discussing the three connotations.

30. “Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation”, NILR, 1980 pp. 18–19.

31. See, e.g., this writer's “Hierarchy Among the Recognized Manifestations (“Sources”) of International Law”, NILR, 1978 pp. 334–344 (and in Estudios de Derecho International: Homenaje al Profesor Miaja de la Muela (Madrid, 1979) pp. 363–374)Google Scholar, and “Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation”, NILR, 1980 pp. 3–38 and 137–170, with extensive reference to publications by other authors.

32. “Enforcement” to be understood, here, in a wide sense, including the very diffuse form of enforcement known in international law and consisting of indirect modes of pressure. Cf., ProfessorReisman, M.W., Nullity and Revision: The Review and Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards (New Haven and London, 1971) pp. 651–652Google Scholar.

33. It is recalled that the subjects of law are fully entitled themselves to perform the activities involved in Phase III. In the event, their final agreement with each other takes the place of a third party decision (e.g., a judicial decision), and it certainly belongs to the LP. In case their agreement is limited to a review of a previous, third party decision (the case envisaged in the text), there, consequently, is no reason not to consider it as part of the LP.

34. See n. 32.

35. Krabbe, Hugo, “L'idée moderne de l'Etat”, Recueil de I'Académie de Droit International 1926–III p. 559et seq.Google Scholar

36. Ibid., p. 563.

37. Ibid., pp. 574 and 579–581.

38. Ibid., pp. 570 and 571.

39. Ibid., p. 579.

40. Langemeijer, G.E., Inleiding tot de studie van de wijsbegeerte des rechts (Introduction to the study of the philosophy of law) (Zwolle, 1956) p. 307Google Scholar.

41. Ibid.

42. Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition by Fitzgerald, P.J. (London, 1966)Google Scholar.

43. Op.cit., pp. 48–59.

44. Schwarzenberger, Georg, “The Fundamental Principles of International Law”, Recueil de I'Académie de Droit International, 1955-I pp. 195–383Google Scholar.

45. Salmond on Jurisprudence p. 53.

46. Ibid., p. 59.

47. “Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation”, NILR, 1980 p. 22Google Scholar.

48. Ago, Roberto, “Positive Law and International Law”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 51 (1957) pp. 691–733CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also his “Science juridique et droit international”, Recueil de I'Académie de Droit International, 1956–11 pp. 857–954.

49. Ago, , “Positive Law and International Law”, AJIL, Vol. 51 (1957) pp. 708–714CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50. Ibid. p. 719.

51. The question is reserved, here, whether custom, instead of proceeding from the will (voluntas), is not, in fact, a product of opinio.