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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
A state's rules of criminal jurisdiction determine the (spatial) scope of its criminal law. Such rules become increasingly important as criminal offences gain an international dimension. Every state has its own rules of criminal jurisdiction. As they form the outcome of considerations involving both legal and political aspects, it is hardly surprising that there are substantial differences between states. Irrespective of their differences, however, these rules are commonly classified according to the so-called ‘principles of jurisdiction’. This classification is based on the connection between the particular offence in question and the state claiming jurisdiction regarding this offence. With regard to the territoriality principle this connecting point forms the locus delicti: the jurisdictional requirement is that the offence is committed within the territory of the state (hereafter: intraterritorial locus delicti) claiming jurisdiction. The other principles are principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction because they apply when the offence is supposed to have been committed outside the country's territory (extraterritorial). The active personality principle is based on the nationality of the offender; a state claims jurisdiction over crimes committed by its own nationals. According to the passive personality principle, the nationality of the victim of the offence provides the basis for the establishment of jurisdiction. The protective principle applies if the extraterritorial offence injures or endangers a certain legal interest to which the state ascribes a particular national importance. With the universality principle there is also a particular legal interest involved, yet, different from the one applying with the protection principle, the interest here is of a universal nature. The differences between jurisdictional systems of states are found in the different elaborations of these principles. The active personality principle, for example, might be applied to all offences, but also to a limited group of offences. Sometimes, the applicability of this principle is subjected to the requirement that the offence in question is punishable according to the law of the state in which the offence is committed (lex loci delicti). In addition, the territoriality principle, which today is considered a jurisdictional starting-point for any state, is interpreted in different ways as each state interprets the locus delicti concept related to this principle in its own way.
2. See, e.g., European Committee on Crime Problems, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction (Strasbourg 1990).Google Scholar
3. See, e.g., European Committee on Crime Problems, Questionnaires and Replies, Appendix to the Report on Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction (Strasbourg 1990).Google Scholar
4. L. H. Leigh, ‘Territorial Jurisdiction and Fraud’, Criminal Law Review (1988) p. 285.
5. This relation does not imply that a state using a wide concept of locus delicti will adopt a reserved attitude on extraterritorial jurisdiction, because even then many acts remain which a state may wish to claim jurisdiction over. Therefore, the following remark of the European Committee on Crime Problems, op. cit. n. 2, at p. 9, is misleading: ‘What is also striking is that use is made of such constructions [to presume an intraterritorial locus delicti] principally by states which nevertheless possess a considerable degree of extraterritorial jurisdiction.’ But this is not striking at all. On the contrary, if a state does not take a reserved attitude on jurisd it is likely that this is manifested in a wide scope of both the territoriality principle and the principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
6. Another example of a new principle with a territorial link, coming from international environmental treaty law, is the ‘loading principle’. See Klages, J., Meeresumweltschutz und Strafrecht (Freiburg-im-Breisgau, Max-Planck-Institut für Ausländisches und Internationales Strafrecht 1989) p. 66.Google Scholar
7. Bowett, D., ‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources’, 53 British Yearbook of International Law (1983) p. 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Meessen, K. L., VüF6;lkerrechtliche Grundsätze des internationalen Kartellrechts (Baaden-Baaden, Nomos 1975) pp. 152 et seq. See, for example, section 98 of the German Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen.Google Scholar
8. See, for example, Higgins, R., ‘The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction’, in Olmstead, C. J., ed., Extra-territorial Application of Laws and Responses Thereto (Oxford, International Law Assocation 1984) p. 7; American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (St. Paul, Minn. 1986) p. 240. From a viewpoint of international law, American doctrine has its advantage (see also n. 39). After all, whether an element is a constituent element of an offence is a matter of national law, and, therefore, cannot be decisive from the point of view of international law.Google Scholar
9. See, for example, Strijards, G. A. M., Internationaal strafrecht, strafmachtsrecht – algemeen deel [International criminal law, criminal jurisdiction – general part] (Arnhem, Gouda Quint 1984) pp. 224 et seq.Google Scholar; Oehler, D., Internationales Strafrecht (Cologne, Heymann 1983) pp. 200 et seq.Google Scholar
10. See, for example, Noyon, T., et al., Het Wetboek van Strafrecht [The Criminal Code] (Arnhem, Gouda Quint 1982) Introduction, p. 72Google Scholar; Jakobs, G., Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (Berlin, De Gruyter 1993) p. 119Google Scholar; Koering-Joulin, R., L 'article 693 du Code de Procédure Pénale et la localisation de l'infraction (Strasbourg, Thèse Dactyl 1972) pp. 296 et seq.Google Scholar
11. There may also, in the case of a ‘conduct crime’, be the question of when the act ‘ends’; whether some act is still relevant to the offence. This needs to be decided using the same criterion as that used under the result theory, i.e., whether the act completed the offence. Thus, the importance of the distinction, often made in this context, between ‘conduct crimes’ and ‘result crimes’, should be relativized. See also Gilbert, G., ‘Crimes sans Frontières: Jurisdictional Problems in English Law’, 62 British Yearbook of International Law (1992) pp. 433, 434.Google Scholar
12. [1984] 3 All ER 565. For more examples see Law Commission, ‘Jurisdiction over Offences of Fraud and Dishonesty with a Foreign Element’, Report no. 180, 1988 (UK) pp. 4 et seq.
13. Oberlandesgericht Koblenz 17 November 1983, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaft, Steuer, Strafrecht 1984, pp. 79, 80.
14. Emphasis added. Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt 12 December 1988, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1989, pp. 675, 676.
15. Cf., Cameron, I., The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction (Aldershot, Dartmouth 1994) p. 58Google Scholar. For examples, see (for French law) Koering-Joulin, op. cit. n. 10, at pp. 138 et seq.; Lombois, C., Droit pènal international (Paris, Daloz 1979) pp. 350 et seq.Google Scholar; (for Belgian law) Spreutels, J., ‘Escroquerie, chèque sans provision et compétence territoriale’, 61 Revue de Droit Pénal (1981) pp. 237–258.Google Scholar
16. It is obvious that in these cases it can be practically difficult to determine the locus delicti. Apart from problems of an evidentiary nature (where was the person ‘doing nothing’ at a certain moment in time), it has to be decided whether a certain omission is yet a constituent element of the offence, with which the offence has begun, and not just a preparatory omission.
17. Things are different, of course, when the use of a certain instrument, like a letter-bomb, is in itself an endangerment of a legally protected interest and therefore an (independent) offence. See Strijards, op. cit. n. 9, at pp. 256, 257.
18. Jescheck, H.-H., Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1988) p. 160.Google Scholar
19. Net, C. B. van der, ‘Locus delicti op het Internet’, 3 Computerrecht (1996) p. 92Google Scholar; Riklin, F., ‘Information Highway und Strafrecht’, in Hilty, R., ed., Information Highway (Bern, Stämpfli 1996) p. 581. The same is true, of course, of other states’ anti-discrimination legislation that determines the locus delicti in the same way.Google Scholar
20. This extension is called for in German and Swiss literature; see Roth, R., ‘Territorialité et extraterritorialité en droit pénal international’, 112 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (1994) p. 6; Jescheck, op. cit. n. 18, at p. 160. According to Swiss case law this extension is accepted, according to German case law it is not.Google Scholar
21. 21 Dominion Law Reports (4th) 174 (1986).
22. Law Commission, supra n. 12, at p. 11. A comparable theory is laid down in the Austrian locus delicti provision (section 67, Criminal Code). For applications of this provision, see Oberster Gerichtshof 12 March 1981, Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung 1982, pp. 48 et seq.; Oberster Gerichtshof 21 October 1987, Juristische Blätter 1988, pp. 659 et seq.
23. See Tirado, (1974) 59 Criminal Appeal Reports 80.
24. Cf., Smith (Wallace Duncan), Criminal Law Review (1996) p. 329.
25. Emphasis added. J.C. Smith, ‘Commentary’, Criminal Law Review (1996) p. 331.
26. But in a different way as with the omission offences (see section 3.1).
27. J.C. Smith, ‘Commentary’, Criminal Law Review (1985) pp. 370, 371.
28. See, for example, P.-Y. Gautier, ‘Sur la localisation de certaines infractions économiques’, 78 Revue Critique de Droit International Privé (1989) p. 677; Lombois, op. cit. n. 15, at pp. 316, 317, 352 et seq.
29. Courde Paris 30 March 1987, Semaine Juridique 1988.II.20965.
30. Cf., Lombois, op. cit. n. 15, at p. 317.
31. Unless, of course, the place where the offender or the victim resides is also the place where a constituent element (commission/omission, result) occurs. But then this place is already regarded as the locus delicti on the basis of the conventional theories.
32. Cf., Lombois, op. cit. n. 15, at pp. 317, 353; Wyngaert, C. van den, ‘Structures et méthodes de la coopération internationale et régionale en matière pénale’, 64 Revue de Droit Pénal (1984) p. 523.Google Scholar
33. The points of reference used for the other principles do not lend themselves so readily to this approach. Furthermore, since the territoriality principle is always considered to have a strong position in international law, this also makes it ‘attractive’ to construe an intraterritorial locus delicti. On top of this – and related to it – in some states, such as England and the United States, the fact that using principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not so common probably plays a part. Cf., Gilbert, op. cit. n. 11, at p. 441.
34. Strijards, op. cit. n. 9, at p. 226.
35. Each new penalization of conduct naturally leads to ‘new’, i.e., added jurisdiction, since a new offence has been created, but that is not the point.
36. One development which will not be discussed is the tendency to penalize the preparation of offences (and not just the attempt to commit an offence). The result theory cannot be used, since there is no result. An alternative for the place where the result occurs is the place where the result would have occured, i.e., the place where the offence would have been completed (in the case of an attempt) or would have been committed (preparation). This method of localizing, especially in the case of preparatory acts, results in very broad (territorial) jurisdiction. The question is whether this is permissible under international law, given that the territorial link is so weak. Cf., Olmstead, C., ‘Jurisdiction’, 14 Yale Journal of International Law (1989) p. 472Google Scholar; Cameron, op. cit. n. 15, at p. 64. See also Wengler, W., ‘Völkerrechtliche Schranken der beeinflussung auslandsverknüpften Verhaltens durch Massnahmen des staatlichen Rechts’, 31 German Yearbook of International Law (1988) p. 459. Here, essentially, we meet with the same problem as with abstract endangerment offences (see section 5.1).Google Scholar
37. See especially Tiedemann, K. and Kindhäuser, U., ‘Umweltstrafrecht – Bewährung oder Reform?’, 8 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (1988) p. 346.Google Scholar
38. See especially Martin, J., Strqfbarkeit grenzüberschreitender Umweltbeeinträchtigungen (Freiburg-im-Breisgau, Max-Planck-Institut für Ausländisches und Internationales Strafrecht 1989).Google Scholar
39. In answering this question, it is irrelevant whether the effect – in casu a mere risk – is a constituent element according to a state's criminal law. See n. 8.
40. This approach has also, but unjustly, been critized for making the protective principle superfluent. Indeed, offences brought under the protective principle are often abstract endangerment offences, but the protected interest sometimes cannot be localised at all, as in the case of an attempt to assassinate the head of state. The protective principle then has its raison d'être when such an offence is committed abroad. See also Cameron, op. cit. n. 15, at p. 63.
41. F.A. Mann, ‘The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years’, 186 Recueil des Cours de l 'Académie de droit international de La Haye (1984) p. 63.
42. No problem arises, of course, when all commissions and omissions clearly took place within the state's territory.
43. This situation comes close to Mann's ‘temporary visitor’; see Mann, op. cit. n. 41, at p. 22.
44. See Bundesgerichtshof 19 June 1986, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1987, p. 1152.
45. Träskman, P. O., ‘Provisions on Jurisdiction in Criminal Law – the Reform of Law caught in the Tension between Tradition and Dynamism’, in Lahti, R. and Nuotio, K., eds., Criminal Law Theory in Transition (Helsinki, Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company 1992) p. 515Google Scholar. For similar approaches, see also Sarkar, L., ‘The Proper Law of Crime in International Law’, in Meuller, G. O. W. and Wise, E. M., eds., International Criminal Law (South Hackensack, New York, Rothman and Co. 1965) p. 76Google Scholar; Legeais, R., ‘L'évolution des solutions françaises de conflits de lois en matière pénale’, in Faculté de droit et des sciences économiques de Poitiers, Mélanges offerts à Réné Savatier (Paris, Dalloz 1965) p. 549Google Scholar; Williams, S. A. and Castel, J.-G., Canadian Criminal Law. International and Transnational Aspects (Toronto, Butterwotths 1981) p. 82.Google Scholar
46. Cf., A.H.J Swart, ‘Jurisdiction in Criminal Law: Some Reflections on the Finnish Code from a Comparative Perspective’, in Lahti and Nuotio, eds., op. cit. n. 45, at p. 531.
47. Van der Net, loc. cit. n. 19, at p. 92.
48. A recent positive exception to this practice, probably because of the fact that a common interest is at stake, is the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities' Financial Interests (Trb. 1995, 289). Art. 4 points out the exact territorial links in respect of which jurisdiction must be claimed.
