The most important political priority of the European Commission in the recast of the Brussels I Regulation has been the abolition of exequatur. The policy to gradually abolish intermediate measures for the enforcement of judgments within the EUflows from the desire to enhance the free movement of judgments and the establishment of a genuine European area ofjustice. Whilst fundamental debate remained absent from the abolition of exequatur in several specific instruments, the abolition of exequatur including the grounds of refusal met with resistance during the negotiations on the recast of Brussels I. As a result of these negotiations, the new Brussels I Regulation – Brussels I-bis – will abolish the requirement to obtain a declaration of enforceability prior to enforcement, but will preserve the grounds of refusal at the enforcement stage. This article evaluates the discussions regarding the abolition of exequatur in the broad context of the EU regulatory and legislative framework, and analyses and assesses the new rules on cross-border enforcement in the Brussels I-bis Regulation. It seeks an answer to the questions (a) whether the new Regulation strikes the right balance between the premise of mutual trust and the need for national control over fundamental rights, (b) to what extent the new regime increases the rights of the judgment debtor while protecting those of the judgment creditor, and (c) whether the outcome of the Brussels I recast will or should have further repercussions for other instruments on cross-border enforcement.

Existing literature on the developing countries' experience with the WTO dispute settlement system (DSS) has paid scant attention to the participation issue of the least developed countries (LDCs), which currently form one-fifth of the WTO membership but constitute less than one per cent of participation in DSS. This article fills this gap by examining several dimensions of LDCs' participation. Upholding the significance of LDCs' participation it explores the challenges faced by LDCs at the pre-litigation, litigation and implementation stage emanating from power asymmetries, resource constraints and flawed DSS remedies. The article particularly looks into the nature of LDCs' participation, which is mostly in the category of third parties. In doing so, it evaluates the third-party participation of Benin and Chad in US – Upland Cotton to ascertain whether third-party participation could be an alternative for LDCs to participate as co-complainants. It analyzes the special and differential treatment provisions of the DSU to further scrutinize whether these provisions and the way they are interpreted and applied in the WTO Panel Reports and the Appellate Body Reports are facilitative for LDCs' participation. Finally, the article makes recommendations to address the challenges on the part of LDCs and to reform DSS so as to make it effective for LDCs' participation.

Compared to other international dispute settlement bodies, the European Court of Human Rights' case law is relatively rich in situations involving a single injury and multiple contributing states. This contribution examines how the ECtHR decides such cases and explores to what extent its approach corresponds to that of the work of the International Law Commission on the topic of international responsibility. The article critically discusses the substantive criteria and doctrinal foundations employed by the ECtHR for allocating responsibility. It reflects on the adequacy of the doctrines used and examines how they can contribute to the general law on shared responsibility.