1. Quoted by Julius, Stone in “Message from Julius Stone”, in Essays in Honor of Hans Kelsen, ed. The California Law Review (1971) p. 612.Google Scholar

2. “…von aller politischen Ideologie und alien naturwissenschaftlichen Elementen gereinigte…” Hans, Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Leipzig & Vienna, 1934) p.iiiGoogle Scholar. Id., revised and amended 2nd. ed., 1960, translated by Max, Knight under the title: Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967)Google Scholar. Unless stated otherwise, the first edition has been used.

3. “Die reine Rechtslehre ist eine Theorie des positiven Rechts”. Reine Rechtslehre, op.cit., p.1.

4. “… Volkenrecht is een verzamelnaam voor alle rechtsregels die kunnen worden toegepast op de betrekkingen tussen eenheden en individuen voor zover zij intemationaal handelingsbekwaam zijn.” Meyers, H., “Volkenrecht” [Public International Law] in Repertorium van de Sociale Wetenschappen (1959) pp. 499–566, at p. 503Google Scholar. In the meantime, Meyers no longer considers this definition as adequate. Nevertheless, it has been used here as a good illustration of the reasoning which follows. For Kelsen's definition see infra n.5.

5. Even in 1966 Kelsen stated: “International Law or the Law of Nations is the name of a body of rules which –according to the usual definition– regulate the conduct of the States in their intercourse with one another”. Principles of International Law, infra n.6, p.3.

6. Hans, Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd. ed. revised and edited by Tucker, R.W. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), Chapter 3Google Scholar. Subsequently referred to as Principles. The first edition came out in 1952 and is not cited in this article.

7. In the original text the Dutch term ‘verdeling’ (German ‘Verteilung’) was used, which is here translated by schema, schematization or arrangement. The Dutch ‘indeling’ (German ‘Einteilung’) is translated by division.

8. Resolution (68) 17 on the “Model plan for the classification of documents concerning State practice in the field of public international law”, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 June 1968.

9. One of the few examples is a short, critical analysis by Charles, Eisenmann, “Sur la Théorie Kelsenienne du Domaine de Validité des Normes Juridiques” [On Kelsen's theory of the sphere of validity of legal norms], in Law, State and International Legal Order: Essays in Honor of Hans Kelsen, Engel, S. ed. (Knoxville, 1964).Google Scholar

10. “Het ligt voor de hand de afbakeningsfunctie te onderscheiden in een afbakening naar de ruimte (A), naar de persoon (B), naar de zakelijke materie (C) en naar de tijd (D)”. Tammes, A.J.P., Internationaal Publiek Recht [Public International Law] (Haarlem, 1966), p. 69.Google Scholar

11. Classification is to be understood as the grouping of entities –e.g. legal rules– into classes. A class consists of a group of entities which have certain characteristics in common. Division is, roughly, the opposite; the splitting-up of classes into sub-classes, etc.

12. Primary forms or intuitions of the sensibility.

13. “Deutungsschema”: “Den spezifisch juristischen Sinn, seine eigentümliche rechtliche Bedeutung erhält der fragliche Sachverhalt durch eine Norm, die sich mit ihrem Inhalt auf ihn bezieht, die ihm die rechtliche Bedeutung veileiht, so dass der Akt nach dieser Norm gedeutet werden kann”. Reine Rechtslehre, p. 5. Later he gives the following description: “A norm prescribes or permits a certain human behaviour” Principles p.5.

14. Hans, Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre [General Theory of the State], in Enzyclopädie der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft, XXIII (Berlin, 1925) p. 95Google Scholar. Hereinafter called Allg. Staatsl.

15. “Der Akzent verschiebt sich von dem ideellen Moment der ‘Ordnung’ auf das anschauliche der ‘Menschen’, deren Verhalten den Inhalt der Ordnung bildet”. Allg. Staatsl., p. 95.

16. “Menschen, die –irgend wie geordnet– zusammenleben”. Id., p. 96.

17. “… einer Vielheit von Menschen auf einem festabgegrenzten Teil der Erdoberfläche, unter einer als Gewalt bezeichneten herrschaftlichen Organisation lebend”. Ibid.

18. Oppenheim, L., International Law. A treatise (London, 1905), p. 108Google Scholar. Eighth edition by Lauterpacht, H. (London, 1955), p. 118.Google Scholar

19. “Ein Staat ist die auf Dauer bezeichnete Zusammenfassung einer Anzahl von Menschen (Staatsvolk) auf einem bestimmten Teil der Erdoberfläche (Staatsgebiet) unter Regelung aller für deren gemeinschaftliches Leben notwendigen Belange durch einen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft obersten Willensträger (Staatsmacht)…“ Seidl-Hohenveldern, I., Völkerrecht [Law of Nations] (1564), p. 114.Google Scholar

20. Weinacht, P.–L., Staat. Studien zur Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes… [State.Research in the history of the meaning of the word] (Berlin, 1968) p. 233.Google Scholar

21. “Die älteren politischen Wissenschaften haben eine mehr oder weniger deutlich entwickelte Raumvorstellung des Staates”. Id., p. 237.

22. “… als Element des Staates –neben der Gewalt und dem Volk –einem drei-dimensionalen Raum annehmen, der nur in der Horizontal, nicht aber in der Vertikale, eine feste Begrenzung findet. Denn nach oben, in der Luft, und nach unten, dem Erdmittelpunkte zu, findet die staatliche Herrschaft nach üblicher Anschauung doch keine begriffswesentlichen Schranken”. Hans, Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts [The Problem of Sovereignty and the Theory of International Law] 2nd. ed. (Tübingen, 1928) p. 73Google Scholar. (1st. ed. in 1920). Hereinafter called Souveränität. One may wonder whether the power of a State upwards is still unrestricted: see e.g. the Treaty of 1966 on principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

23. “Ce qu'on nomme le territoire de l'Etat n'est pas, comme on se le figure d'ordinaire, une portion nettement délimitée de la surface terrestre, qui servirait pour ainsi dire de base à l'Etat –mais simplement l'étendue pour laquelle vaut l'ordre étatique”. Hans, Kelsen, “Les rapports de systeme entie le droit interne et le droit international public” [Relations between National Law and International Law], 14 Hague Recueil (1926-IV) pp. 231–329, at p. 247Google Scholar. Hereinafter called Les rapp. de syst.

24. Principles p. 308.

25. “Nur insofern ein und dieselbe Rechtsordnung für eine Vïelheit von Menschen gilt, bilden dieseeine Einheit”. Allg. Staatsl. p. 149.

26. “… qu'il faut entendre par peuple l'ensemble des individus pour lesquels l'ordre étatique est valable, l'ensemble des actes individuels auxquels il s'applique, c'est-à-dire son domaine de validité quant aux personnes”. Les rapp. de syst., p. 251.

27. “ … sein Verhalten den Inhalt der Rechtsordnung bildet”. Allg. Staatsl. p. 149.

28. “Staatsbürger”. Allg. Staatsl., p. 150. Kelsen understands by nationals of the State: all individuals who, in principle, are subject to the duties which the State imposes and who may exercise all the rights the State endows upon them. Allg. Staatsl. p. 159. In Principles too, he mentions a number of exceptions to the validity of the personal sphere, e.g. those individuals who are ‘extraterritorial’. For a definition of extraterritoriality, see Section 2 p. 192.

29. “… nur auf Grund einer normativen Ordnung möglich, durch die einzel-menschlichen Akte erst aus der unbegrenzten Fülle menschlichen Verhaltens herausgehoben, spezifisch normativ qualifiziert und zu jener Einheit verbunden werden, die man als ‘Staat’ bezeichnet”. Allg. Staatl. p. 97.

30. “Si l'Etat est un ordre juridique, si son territoire est le domaine spatial de validité et son peuple le domaine de validité quant aux personnes de cet ordre, il est presque évident que la puissance étatique ne peut être autre chose que la validité de cet ordre ou cet ordre envisagé dans la validité qui le caractérise”. Les rapp. de syst., p. 252.

31. “… die Fähigkeit der Staatsgewalt, ihre Kompetenz, d.h. ihren Wirkungskreis selbst zu bestimmen”. Souveränität, p. 47.

32. “… eine Möglichkeit der Abänderung der Rechtsordnung …, und zwar einer solchen Aenderung, die eine Ausdehnung oder Einengung des sachlichen Geltungsgebietes der Rechtsordnung involviert”. Id., p. 48.

33. “A côté de la validité de l'ordre étatique dans l'espace et quant aux personnes, il faut en envisager également la validité dans le temps, bieri que la théorie traditionelle de l'état ne fasse pas place au temps comme élément de l'état à côté de l'espace”. Les rapp. de syst., p. 252.

34. See for the coming into existence of a national legal order the treatise on ‘Recognition of a State’, Principles p. 387 et seq., and for the termination of same, Ibid., p. 383 et seq.

35. ‘Allgemeine Norminhalte’. Souveränität, p. 72.

36. “Die Geltung der die staatliche Ordnung bindenden Rechtsnormen ist somit eine raum-zeitliche Geltung in dem Sinne, dass diese Normen raum-zeitliche Vorg¨ange zum Inhalt haben”. Allg. Staatsl., p. 137.

37. Hans, Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1945), p. xiiiGoogle Scholar. Hereinafter called General Theory.

38. Kunz, J.L., The Changing Law of Nations (Toledo, USA, 1968), p. 80.Google Scholar

39. Principles p. 177.

40. Ibid. This is the only quotation (in this article) which deviates from the corresponding one in the first edition of Principles (1952). See for this difference which is of little importance: 1st. ed., p. 93: “… the material element is the behaviour, that is to say, the acts which the individual ought to perform or from the performance of which he ought to refrain. Hence …”.

41. “Une norme doit imposer quelque chose à quelqu'un, quelque part, et à un moment donné, sinon elle n'aurait pas de validité.” Hans, Kelsen, “Théorie Générate du Droit International Public” [General Theory of Public International Law], 42 Hague Recueil (1932-IV) pp. 121–351 at p. 138Google Scholar. Hereinafter called Théorie Générate.

42. “Allerdings ist es der Kant des Neukantianismus besonders der Marburger Schule (Cohen, Natorp), von der die heutige Rechtsphilosophie grossenteils ausgeht, besonders Kelsen und seine Schule,… ”. Kunz, J.L., Völkerrechtswissenschaft und Reine Rechtslehre [Science of International Law and Pure Theory of Law], in Wiener Staatswissenschaftliche Studien, vol. 3 (Vienna, 1923) p. 4.Google Scholar

43. “Primary forms or intuitions of the sensibility”; the premises for each observation. See also von Aster, E., Geschichte der Philosophie [History of Philosophy], 15th ed. (Stuttgart, 1968) p. 280.Google Scholar

44. [Time and space form] “allgemeine Norminhalte” [since] “… menschliches Verhalten… in Zeit und Raum sich vollzieht… ”. Souveränität, p. 72. See also supra. Section 1.2.4.

45. “Raum und Zeit als Inhalt der Rechtsnormen”. Allg. Staatsl., p. 137.

46. “Wir bemächtigen uns dieser physischen Welt durch das Studium ihrer Gesetze. Diese Gesetze können nur gefunden werden, indem der Erlebnischarakter unserer Eindrücke von der Natur, der Zusammenhang, in dem wir, sofern wir selber Natur sind, mit ihm stehen, das lebendige Gefühl, in dem wir sie geniessen, immer mehr zurücktritt hinter das abstrakte Auffassen derselben nach den Relationen von Raum, Zeit, Masse, Bewegung”. Wilhelm, Dilthey, “Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften” [The construction of the historical world in the philosophic sciences], in Auswahl aus Dilthey's Schriften von 1867–1910 (published by H. Nohl, 1946) pp. 233–234Google Scholar. This article of Dilthey is mainly based on lectures which he gave until 1910 for the German Academy of Sciences. The essence of the article had already been published in 1905.

47. “Comme la norme relie ensemble des faits, et essentiellement des faits de conduite humaine, et que ces faits se situent dans le temps et dans l'espace, on peut distinguer: (1) l'espace où doivent se produire les faits prévus par la norme; (2) l'époque à laquelle ils doivent se produire; (3) le sujet de qui ils doivent émaner; (4) la conduite de ce sujet à un certain moment et qui peut être une action ou une abstention;… Il faut done distinguer les domaines de validité territorial, personnel, matériel et temporel…” Théorie Générale p. 138. This justification can also be found in General Theory, pp. 42–43, in Reine Rechtslehre (1934) pp. 7–8 and in Principles pp. 177–178.

48. General Theory p. 42.

49. Id., p. 43.

50. See above n.43.

51. “En premier lieu c'est le concept de ‘domaine de validité matériel’, qui paraît inacceptable: ce que Kelsen désigne de ce nom n'a rien à voir avec la notion, avec sa notion de domaine de validité, parce que la matière ou objet –c'est-à-dire le secteur de la conduite humaine … auquel se rapporte une norme n'a rien à voir avec sa validité”. Charles Eisenmann, op.cit. in n.9, p. 63.

52. Principles p. 307.

53. Ibid.

54. Id., pp. 361–362.

55. In this connection attention is drawn to a change made in the second edition of Principles. A fifth subtitle, namely: “The Principle of Effectiveness” has been added in Chapter 3. This chapter describes the four spheres of validity of the national legal order as determined by the international legal order. No reasons are given to explain why this principle of effectiveness has been added at this point. In a legal -philosophical treatise R.A. Samek argues that Kelsen makes a clear distinction between the “effectiveness” of a norm, or as Samek calls it, an “is-fact” (“ … the fact that the norm is actually applied and obeyed …”), and the validity of a norm ( “ the norm ought to be obeyed and applied”). Such a statement is not surprising if one takes into account that Kelsen wished to create a ‘pure’ theory of law, purified as much as possible from natural scientific influences. Basing himself on Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd. ed. (1960), Samek asserts: “A minimum of effectiveness is a condition of the validity of a legal norm, though such a norm may become valid before it becomes effective”. See Sarnek, R.A., The Legal Point of View (New York, 1974) p. 176Google Scholar. It is not clear why the principle of effectiveness has been inserted in Chapter 3 and not earlier, e.g. in Chapter 2, which deals with essential aspects of a legal norm such as validity. As the principle of effectiveness does not appear to have any impact on Kelsen's schema it will not be further considered here.

56. Hempel, C.G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York, 1965), p. 137Google Scholar, n.2.

This article discusses only two taxonomical procedures: division and classification. Hempel suggests a third procedure which he calls “ordering”. His idea of “ordering” which he describes in Aspects of Scientific Explanation is as yet little elaborated, for which reason it can be disregarded in this article (See “Fundamentals of Taxonomy” in C.G. Hempel, op.cit., p. 137 et seq.). Kelsen's schema is certainly not an “ordering” within the meaning of Hempel's notion of this procedure.

57. Rescher, N., Introduction to Logic (New York, 1964) p. 50.Google Scholar

58. Venn, J., The Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic, 2nd. ed. (London, 1907) p. 323 (1st ed. 1889).Google Scholar

59. Latta, R. & Macbeath, A., The Elements of Logic (London, 1929) p. 154.Google Scholar

60. Mill, J. Stuart, A System of Logic (New York, 1860) p. 432.Google Scholar

61. Tammes, op.cit., p. 69.

62. Rescher, op.cit., p. 227.

63. Cohen, M.R. & Nagel, E., An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (reprint, New York, 1966) p. 241.Google Scholar

64. Stebbing, L.S., A Modern Introduction to Logic (London, 1933) p. 194.Google Scholar

65. Id., p. 422.

66. Id., Chapter 22, paragraph 2.

67. Rescher, op.cit., p. 38.

68. Stebbing, op.cit., p. 433.

69. Mace, C.A., The Principles of Logic (London, 1933) p. 194.Google Scholar

70. Ibid.

71. Stebbing, op.cit., p. 438.

72. Some authors do not draw a fundamental distinction between classification and division. The term division is used only to refer to one splitting-up, in which case classification means: a number of splittings-up succeeding each other. This is the meaning given to division in 2.2.2. See Latta & Macbeath, op.cit., p. 153. This article will follow the usual practice found in logical literature, and will use the more substantial differentiation between the procedures.

73. Stebbing, op.cit., p, 438,

74. Mace, op.cit., p. 193.

75. Id., p. 194.

76. Eaton, Ralph M., General Logic (reprint, New York, 1959), p. 282.Google Scholar

77. Mace, op.cit., p. 196.

78. Eaton, op.cit., p. 283; see also Cohen & Nagel, op.cit., p. 242.

79. Rescher, op.cit., p. 52. Rescher calls his rules “classification rules”. He remarks, however, that these rules are also applicable to divisions. We will return to this in 2.3.1.

80. This example is from Reschei, op.cit., p. 53.

81. Eaton, op.cit., p. 283; see also Latta & Macbeath, op.cit., p. 151.

82. Stebbing, op.cit., p. 435.

83. See for example Eaton, op.cit., p. 282: “The rules for division, applicable also to classification, are …”.

84. One may ask oneself whether an ‘invalid’ legal norm does not constitute a contradictio in terminis for Kelsen. It would be going too far to discuss this juridical problem at this point, though it is indeed important. For this reason ‘invalid’ legal norms are only used as a class. It is possible that this class does not contain entities.

85. Section 1, n.41, above.

86. See above, p. 173.

87. This is certainly not so; for example, nowhere is it clarified why the authors give these rules, and one or two others, for division. Moreover “formal” logic, too, is based on axioms.

88. Cohen & Nagel, op.cit., p. 242; see also Eaton, op.cit., p. 283.

89. In 2.9 we will return to the criteria which Kelsen gives (or rather does not give) for determining under which sphere of validity, derived from the elements theory, certain rules of international law should be placed.

90. This reasoning points in the direction of a difference in ‘nature’ between the two justifications. No attempt will be made in this article to examine whether these justifications are harmonious or contradictory.

91. The starting point here –see also 2.2– is that legal rules may indeed be considered as an “existential subject matter” in a logical sense. Carl Hempel states, for example: “The objects of a classification may be concrete things such as stars, crystals, organisms, books and so on; or they may be abstract entities such as numbers, kinship systems, political ideologies, religions, or philosophical doctrines”. Hempel, op.cit., pp. 137–138. In this connection it may be useful to remark that older logical literature dealing with classification and division mainly refers to empirical “universes of discourse”. The subject is discussed particularly within the framework of inductive logic. Divisions derived deductively are often arrogantly thrust aside as “metaphysical” and receive little attention. In later literature this distinction is no longer made.

92. Cohen & Nagel, op.cit., p. 242.

93. Mace, op.cit., p. 194.

94. Cohen & Nagel, op.cit., p. 243.

95. Id., p. 242.

96. Mace, op.cit., p. 197.

97. Cohea & Nagel, op.cit., p. 224.

98. Id., p. 242.

99. Mace, op.cit., p. 197.

100. “In deze systernatiek is ‘naar de materie’ een onderafdeling waar geen mens logisch zou kunnen concluderen wat er zou thuis horen”. Röling, B.V.A., “Boekbespreking van Prof. Mr. A.J.P. Tammes, International Publiek Recht” [Book Review of Professor Tammes' Public International Law], in 14 N.T.I.R. (1967) pp. 275–285, at p. 282Google Scholar. Tammes follows Kelsen closely in this and, moreover, speaks of a division, as has been mentioned on p. 175.

101. J. Venn, op.cit., p. 323.

102. Keynes, J.N., Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic, 4th improved ed. (London, 1928), p. 443Google Scholar (1st ed. 1884).

103. Id.

104. Rescher, op.cit. p. 52.

105. Principles, p. 372.

106. “Bald hat man wieder nut die Staatsgewalt, oder gar nur thre obersten Organe im Auge, wenn man von ‘Staat’ schlechtweg spricht”. Allg. Staatsl., p. 96.

107. “Staatliche Organe”. Alfred, Verdross, Völkerrecht [Law of Nations] (Vienna, 1964), p. 330.Google Scholar

108. Principles, p. 366.

109. Id., p. 345.

110. Id., p. 366.