1. Italics supplied.

2. League of Notions, Verbatim Records and Texts relating to the Convention on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern (Geneva, 1921) (hereafter: Conference on Navigable Waterways), p. 209.Google Scholar

3. Martens, NR, vol. 5, p. 714 etseq.; English text in 8 BFSP, p. 953 et seq.

4. Martens, NR, vol. 6 part 1, p. 301 et seq. English text in Hertslet, , The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. 1, p. 707Google Scholar et seq. (incomplete text).

5. Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international, ed. Basdevant, (1960), p. 98Google Scholar; idem: article on “cabotage” by Krüger, in Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, ed. Schlochauer, , vol. I (1961), p. 263.Google Scholar

6. “Les fleuves et canaux internationaux”, Bibliotheca Visseriana vol. 2 (1924), p. 145.Google Scholar

7. Die neue Grossschiffahrtsstrasse Rhein-Main-Donau (1973), p. 33, n. 38.Google Scholar

8. Conference on Navigable Waterways, p. 428.Google Scholar

9. Ibid., loc.cit.

10. Martens, NRG 3rd series, vol. 18, p. 717 et seq.

11. Conference on Navigable Waterways, p. 328.Google Scholar

12. Cf. League of Nations, Doc.C.195 M.78, 1931 VIII.

13. Martens, Supp., vol. 4, p. 36 et seq.

14. See the present author's article: “The regime of navigation on international waterways. Part III: Substantive rights and duties”, 7 NYIL (1976), p. 14 n. 28.Google Scholar

15. Martens, NR, vol. 2, p. 379 et seq.; 2 BFSP, p. 52 et seq.

16. Case relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder. PCIJ Series A, no. 23, p. 27.

17. Ibid., p. 28.

18. Ed. Engelhardt writes that the Act of Vienna is absolutely silent on the reservation of cabotage and that one would look in vain for a justification of the restrictions on the free exercise of the shipping trade on certain rivers. He wonders how the reservation of cabotage could possibly be reconciled with the fundamental principles of the community of riparians. Du régime conventionnel des fleuves internationaux (1879), pp. 95 and 104.Google Scholar

19. Article 4, Act of Navigation of the Elbe (1821); Article 4, Act of Navigation of the Weser (1823).

20. Articles 2(2) and 3, Elbe Navigation Act (1821).

21. Martens, NR, vol. 9, p. 252 et seq.

22. Cf. Mallinckrodt, , Die rechtliche Grundlagen der Schiffahrtspolizei auf der preussischen Rheinstrecke (1911), pp. 49–50.Google Scholar

23. Questions juridiques relatives à la navigation du Rhin (1956), p. 142.Google Scholar

24. “Die Freiheit der Rheinschiffahrt”, Festschrift für Herbert Kraus (1954), p. 208Google Scholar; note the substantially analogous reasoning of Lupi, , “La liberté de navigation sur le Rhin”, Journal du droit international (1958), p. 352.Google Scholar

25. “Vrije vaart op den Nederlandschen Rijn” (1937), Verzamelde Geschriften (1947), vol. 4, pp. 57–59.Google Scholar

26. Offener Brief in Beantwortung einer Frage der Rotterdammer Handelskammer (1950).Google Scholar

27. “De Akte van Mannheim”, Internationale Spectator (1955), pp. 446–447.Google Scholar

28. Die Rheinschiffahrtsverträge und die Cabotage (1957), p. 43.Google Scholar

29. “La liberté de la navigation rhénane en danger”, Annexe to Strom und See (December 1953), p. 10.Google Scholar

30. Das Recht der intemationalen Gewässer (1920), p. 102.Google Scholar

31. Rheinurkunden – Rijndocumenten (hereafter: Rhine documents), vol. 1 (1918), p. 314 et seq.Google Scholar

32. In the words of the Permanent Court of Arbitration: “L'exécution des engagements est, entre Etats comme entre particuliers, le plus sûr commentaire du sens des engagements.” Affaire de l'indemnité russe. [The performance of an obligation is, between both States and individuals, the surest commentary on the sense of obligation. The Russian Indemnity Case.] Martens, NRG 3rd series, vol. 6, p. 653 et seq. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice: “The intention of the Parties, which is to be ascertained from the contents of the Agreement, taking into consideration the manner in which the Agreement has been applied, is decisive.” Jurisdiction of the Tribunals of Danzig. PCIJ series B, no. 15, p. 18. Similarly: Serbian loans, PCIJ series A, nos. 20–21, p. 38; Brazilian loans, PCIJ series A, nos. 20–21, p. 119; Corfu Channel (merits), ICJ Reports 1949, p. 25; International Status of South-West Africa, ICI Reports 1950, pp. 135–136; Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (jurisdiction), ICJ Reports 1952, pp. 110–111; The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ICJ Reports 1953, pp. 58–59. According to Art. 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed on 23 May, 1969, “there shall be taken into account, together with the context: any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” Trb. 1972 no. 51.

33. Cf. Van Eysinga, Offener Brief; W. Müller, op.cit., p. 11.

34. Rhine documents, vol. 1, pp. 474–476.

35. Martens, NRG, vol. 6, p. 386 et seq.

36. According to Article 3: “Binnenschifffahrt auf der Elbe, d.h. die Befugniss zur Beförderung von Personen und Gütern von einem Elbuferplatze seines Gebietes nach einem andern Elbuferplatze desselben Gebietes, kann jeder Staat seinen Unterthanen vorbehalten.” [Each State may reserve inland navigation on the Elbe to its own nationals, that is, the right to carry persons and goods from one Elbe port in its territory to another Elbe port within the same territory.]

37. Cf. Ed. Engelhardt, op.cit., p. 93. Idem: Van der Hoeven, op.cit., pp. 53–57.

38. Martens, NRG, vol. 14, p. 525 et seq.; 38 BFSP, p. 130.

39. Martens, NRG, vol. 16 part 2, p. 63 et seq.

40. Martens, NRG, vol. 16 part 2, p. 75 et seq.

41. Martens, NRG, vol. 15, p. 770 et seq.; English text in Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648–1967, ed. Israel, F.L., vol. 3, (1967), p. 947 et seq.Google Scholar

42. Martens, NRG, vol. 16 part 2, p. 43 et seq.

43. Sturdza, , Recueil des documents relatifs à la liberté de navigation du Danube (1904), p. 78 et seq.Google Scholar

44. Initially the rules on the navigation of the Lower Danube were laid down in Title II of the Public Act of 2 November 1865 (Martens NRG, vol. 17, p. 143 et seq.). These rules were replaced by the Navigation Regulations of 8 November 1870 (Martens, NRG, vol. 20, p. 40 et seq.) as regards the section to Galatz, and subsequently by the Navigation Regulations for the Danube and its mouth (“maritime Danube”) of 19 May 1881 (Martens, NRG 2nd series, vol. 9, p. 254 et seq.), and by the Regulation on Navigation and Police of 2 June 1882 for the section between the Iron Gates and Braila, by virtue of Article 7 of the Treaty of London of 10 March 1883 (Martens, NRG 2nd series, vol. 10, p. 252 et seq.; 74 BFSP, p. 20). The Regulation on Navigation and Police of 10 November 1911 (Martens, NRG 3rd series, vol. 9, p. 252 et.seq.) constituted the last modification of the regime of the Lower Danube before World War I.

45. Martens, NRG, vol. 20, p. 355 et seq.

46. Cf. Advisory opinion in the case concerning Polish Postal Service in Danzig. PCIJ Series B, no. 11, p. 37.

47. Article 32 deals with fines for infringement of police regulations in the field of navigation.

48. “Der Artikel 24 handelt von der Fährgerechtigkeit und entspricht dem ersten Satz des Artikels 46 der Akte von 1831. Der übrige inhalt dieses Artikels ist als selbstverständlich weggelassen worden.” Rhine Documents, vol. 2, p. 107.

49. Das internationale Recht der Rheinschiffahrt und der nationale Binnenverkehr (Cabotage) (1950), p. 50.Google Scholar

50. Op.cit., p. 352. See also the more or less identical opinions of Schilling, loc.cit. in n. 24, Kraus, , Questions juridiques relatives à la navigation du Rhine (1956), p. 62Google Scholar, and Schluckebier, , Internationales Rheinschiffahrtsrecht (1956), p. 77.Google Scholar

51. Revision of the Rhine Navigation Act 1831. Edition of the Central Commission, 1928, p. 95.

52. Op.cit., p. 53.

53. International Law in Historical Perspective. Part III (1970), p. 136.Google Scholar

54. Similarly, Title V of the Act of Mainz, which provided for freedom of affreightment, was completely abrogated by the Act of Mannheim. According to the liberal views reflected in the Prussian memorandum of 1867 on the revision of the Act of Mainz, the provisions of this Act which dealt with matters governed by civil law should not be reproduced in the new treaty. They were either superfluous or inadmissible, superfluous if they were in accordance with the private law of the riparian States, inadmissible if they countered such law. Revision of the Rhine Navigation Act 1831, p. 91.Google Scholar

55. The rights and privileges which the Act of Mannheim granted to vessels belonging to the Rhine navigation were, under Article 356 of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles (Martens, NRG 3rd series, vol. 11, p.323 et seq.) extended to the vessels of all nations and their cargoes.

56. Op.cit., pp. 36–37.

57. See the present author's article, “The regime of navigation on international waterways. Part I: The Beneficiaries of the right of navigation”, 5 NYIL (1974), p. 160.Google Scholar

58. Martens, NRG 2nd series, vol. 10, p. 414 et seq.

59. Italics supplied.

60. Martens, NRG 2nd series, vol. 10, p. 222.

61. 9 Annuaire (1887), p. 182 et seq.Google Scholar

62. Ibid., p. 174.

63. See the Chapter “Das Stromgebietsrecht und die internationale Flussschiffahrt”, Handbuck des Völkerrechts, Holtzendorff, , ed. vol. 2 (1887), p. 330.Google Scholar

64. Treaty of Saint-Germain, Martens, NRG 3rd series, vol. 11, p. 691 et seq.; Treaty of Neuilly, ibid., vol. 12, p. 325 et seq.; Treaty of Trianon, ibid., vol. 12, p. 423 et seq.

65. Art. 378 of the Treaty of Versailles, Art. 330 of the Treaty of Saint Germain, Art. 247 of the Treaty of Neuilly, Art. 313 of the Treaty of Trianon. Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were nevertheless to observe the rule of reciprocity, even in this period, in respect of Austria and Hungary.

66. Conference on navigable waterways, p. 215.Google Scholar

67. Ibid., p. 215.

68. Ibid., pp. 209–210.

69. Ibid., pp. 206, 214–215 and 431.

70. Ibid., pp. 215–218.

71. Ibid., pp. 220–221.

72. Ibid., p. 208.

73. Ibid., pp. 207 and 218–219.

74. Cf. Sosa-Rodriquez, , Les fleuves de l'Amérique latine et le droit des gens (1935), pp. 109–113.Google Scholar

75. See, Art. 3 of the Treaty between Argentina and Paraguay of 23 January 1967 on the navigation on the Paraguay, Paraná and Rio de la Plata. 634 UNITS, p. 181 et seq.

76. Vitányi, op.cit., pp. 141–143.

77. Conference on navigable waterways, pp. 202–205 and 259–260.Google Scholar

78. Ibid., p. 202.

79. Ibid., p. 219.

80. The Greek delegation published a declaration opposing the clauses contained in Art. 5 of the Statute, which it considered to be incompatible with the principles and provisions of the Treaties of Peace and the Covenant of the League of Nations. Consequently, Greece refused to adhere to the Convention and Statute of Barcelona. Ibid., pp. 369–370. The Yugoslav delegation voted for the Convention, but made a reservation regarding the first section of Article 5, which provided for the maintenance of any greater freedom of navigation already established in a previous act of navigation. Ibid., p. 371.

81. Ibid., p. 266.

82. Ibid., pp. 267–268. It may be noted that Art. 354 of the Treaty of Versailles prescribed the establishment of a new Rhine Navigation Act.

83. Ibid., p. 267.

84. Ibid., p. 268.

85. Ibid., p. 328. The last sentence of Art. 20 under which the Statute does not prohibit the grant of greater facilities [for the free exercise of navigation] in the future, was also designed to appease the Belgian delegation.

86. Martens, NRG 3rd series, vol. 12, p. 606 et seq.; 26 LNTS, p. 185.

87. Germany, Belgium, Greece and Yugoslavia. Romania subjected its adherence to the condition that the provisions of the Statute of Barcelona could not be deemed to be in conflict with the principles of the Danube Statute of 1921. 15 LNTS, p. 307.

88. Cf. Hajnal, , Le droit du Danube international (1929), p. 280.Google Scholar

89. Martens, NRG 3rd series, vol. 12, p. 632 et seq.; 26 LNTS, p. 227.

90. Central Commission for the Rhine Navigation, Protocols (1924), I, nos. 16–20.

91. Loc.cit.

92. Martens, NRG 3rd series, vol. 36 part 3, p. 769 et seq.

93. Cf. Ferrier, , La liberté de navigation sur le Rhine de Bâle à la mer (1955), p. 46Google Scholar; Schluckebier, op.cit., p. 74.

94. 38 Annuaire (1934), p. 713 et seq.

95. Ibid., pp. 605–606.

96. Ibid., p. 592.

97. 33 UNTS, p. 181 et seq.

98. See, Kunz, , “The Danube Regime and the Belgrade Conference”, 43 AJIL (1949), p. 111CrossRefGoogle Scholar et seq.; Imbert, , “Le régime juridique actuel du Danube”, 55 RGDIP (1951), p. 82 et seqGoogle Scholar.; Seidl-Hohenveldern, , “Die Belgrader Donaukonvention von 1948”, 7 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1958/1959), p. 253 et seqGoogle Scholar.; Gorove, , Laws and Politics of the Danube (1964), p. 96 et seq.Google Scholar

99. Conférence danubienne Beograd 1948. Publication of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1949), pp. 120–121.

100. Ibid., p. 137.

101. Rhine documents, vol. 1, p. 124.

102. In this context it may be noted that Art. 32 of the Draft Convention which the U.S. delegation presented to the Belgrade Conference also contained the provision that “Each riparian State can determine the conditions of local transport of persons and goods between the ports situated within its territory.” Conférence danubienne, p. 347. The reservation of local transport corresponds to the American practice (see, supra p. 21).

103. Öffentlicher Anzeiger für das Vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet, no. 10.

104. Ibid., no. 72.

105. Bundesanzeiger (1949), no. 11.

106. Trb. 1955 no. 161, pp. 154–155.

107. Cf. W. Müller, op.cit., p. 8; Van der Hoeven, op.cit., p. 9.

108. The Commission referred, in addition to German measures, to certain Dutch legal provisions concerning the systems of rotation and proportional cargo sharing.

109. La navigation du Rhine. Periodical of the Central Commission (1950), p. 532.

110. “Die Niederländische Regierung möchte zuerst daran erinnern, dass der Rheinschiffahrt die Mannheimer Akte vom 17 Oktober 1868 und die damit zusammenhängenden Anderungen und Durchführungsbestimmungen zugrundeliegen, welches Abkommen in den Artikeln 1 und 4 die Freiheit der Fahrt wie auch die Gleichheit der Behandlung auf dem ganzen Rhein verbürgt, also auch die Freiheit zur Beteiligung der niederländischen Schiffe an Transporten zwischen zwei in Deutschland gelegenen Punkten.”

“Die Niederlandische Regierung möchte besonders darauf drängen, dass die Bundesrepublik die Bestimmungen der Mannheimer Akte einhält und dass den Worten, mit denen die Bundesregierung der Zentralkommission für die Rheinschiffahrt beigetreten ist, entsprechen wird.”

Jaarboek van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (1953/1954), pp. 258–259.Google Scholar

111. “Alle internationalen Vereinbarungen auf dem Gebiet der Binnenschiffahrt dienen von jeher der Freiheit der Schiffahrt im grenzüberschreitenden Verkehr von und zum Meere. Der Strom als Schiffahrtstrasse sollte frei sein und den Schiffen aller Flaggen offenstehen. Wo darüber hinaus eine Beschränkung der Territorialhoheit, z.B. auf dem Gebiet der kleinen Cabotage beabsichtigt war, ist sie in den Strom-Akten jeweils besonders zum Ausdruck gebracht worden.”

“Unbeschadet dieser Rechtsauffassung stellt die Bundesregierung jedoch fest, dass eine allgemeine Beschränkung des innerdeutschen Verkehrs auf die deutsche Flagge zu keinem Zeitpunkt erfolgt ist. Jedes Schïff kann im grenzüberschreitenden Verkehr eine Zwischenreise im innerdeutschen Verkehr durchführen.” Ibid., pp. 262–263.

112. In the Dictionnaire de la termininologie du droit international (p. 263)Google Scholar, the principle of estoppel is defined as follows: “Terme de procédure emprunté à la langue anglaise qui désigne l'objection péremptoire qui s'oppose à ce qu'une partie à un procès prenne une position qui contredit soit ce qu'elle a antérieurement admis expressément ou tacitement, soit ce qu'elle prétend soutenir dans la même instance.“ According Vice-President Alfaro: “Whatever term or terms be employed to designate this principle such as it has been applied in the international sphere, its substance is always the same: inconsistency between claims or allegations put forward by a State, and its previous conduct in connection therewith, is not admissible (allegans contraria non audiendus est). Its purpose is always the same: a State must not be permitted to benefit by its own inconsistency to the prejudice of another State (nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam).… Finally, the legal effect of the principle is always the same: the party.which by its recognition, its representation, its declaration, its conduct or its silence has maintained an attitude manifestly contrary to the right it is claiming before an international tribunal is precluded from claiming that right.” Separate Opinion in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (merits). ICJ Reports 1962, p. 40. Judge Fitzmaurice explained the juridical substance of the estoppel as follows: “The principle of preclusion is the nearest equivalent in the field of international law to the common law rule of estoppel, though perhaps not applied under such strict limiting conditions (and it is certainly applied as a rule of substance and not merely as one of evidence or procedure). It is quite distinct theoretically from the notion of acquiescence. But acquiescence can operate as a preclusion or estoppel in certain cases, for instance where silence, on an occasion where there was a duty or need to speak or act, implies agreement, or a waiver of rights, and can be regarded as a representation to that effect.” “The essential condition of the operation of the rule of preclusion or estoppel, as strictly to be understood, is that the party invoking the rule must have ‘relied upon’ the statements or conduct of the other party, either to its own detriment or to the other's advantage. The often invoked necessity for a consequent ‘change of position’ on the part of the party invoking preclusion or estoppel is implied in this. A frequent source of misapprehension in this connection is the assumption that change of position means that the party invoking preclusion or estoppel must have been led to change its own position, by action it has itself taken consequent on the statements or conduct of the other party. It certainly includes that: but what it really means is that these statements, or this conduct, must have brought about a change in the relative positions of the parties, worsening that of the one, or improving that of the other, or both.” Ibid., pp. 62–63.

This principle, expressed in the adage “non concedit venire contra factum proprium” which is essentially based on the good faith which is supposed to govern international relations, was applied by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case concerning the legal status of Eastern Greenland. The Court said that Norway – as a result of the undertaking implying recognition of Danish sovereignty over Greenland as a whole – was under an obligation to refrain from contesting this sovereignty. PCIJ Series A/B, no. 53, p. 73. In the Fisheries Case the Court came to the following conclusion: “The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international community, Great Britain's position in the North Sea, her own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would in any case warrant Norway's enforcement of her system against the United Kingdom.” ICJ Reports 1951, p. 139. Similarly, in the Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States in Morocco: “ … the situation in which the United States continued after 1937 to exercise consular jurisdiction over all criminal and civil cases in which United States nationals were defendants, is one that must be regarded as in the nature of a provisional situation acquiesced in by the Moroccan authorities.” ICJ Reports 1952, pp. 200–201. According to the Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: “Having regard to these considerations of principle, it appears to the Court that only the existence of a situation of estoppel could suffice to lend substance to this contention, that is to say if the Federal Republic were now precluded from denying the applicability of the conventional régime, by reason of past conduct, declarations, etc., which not only clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that régime, but also caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct, detrimentally to change position or suffer some prejudice. Of this there is no evidence whatever in the present case.” ICJ Reports 1969, p. 26.

113. Bundesanzeiger (1956), no. 83.

114. On the occasion of the circular's publication it was indicated that this measure implied no limitation whatsoever on the freedom of action of the Federal Government in the future. In the view of Lupi: “ … in any case the legal question of the admissibility of reservation of cabotage was left pending … ”, op.cit., p. 350.

115. 298 UNTS, p. 3 et seq.

116. Trb. 1960.no. 71.

117. Verträge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. vol. II (1959), p. 34 et seq.Google Scholar