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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
In recent decades, scholars have increasingly reached agreement on how to interpret Aquinas’ account of the rational grounding of faith. Drawing comparisons between Aquinas’ position and Alvin Plantinga's “Reformed Epistemology”, many commentators hold that according to Thomas, belief that the articles of faith are divinely revealed (and thus, true) can be rational even absent naturally perceptible evidence that the articles are so revealed. In Plantinga's terms, belief in the articles of faith is “properly basic”. Although this interpretation is plausible, its proponents have further argued or implied that Aquinas’ account only renders basic belief in the articles rationally justified in an “externalist” sense. Thomas’ observation that there is naturally perceptible evidence (e.g. miracles performed by prophets) that the articles are revealed is supposedly crucially important, because only the perception of such evidence renders belief in the articles justified in an internalist sense. In this article, I argue to the contrary that on Aquinas’ account, one with basic belief in the articles can have “internalist” justification for her belief without possessing naturally perceptible evidence that the articles are revealed. Thomas’ contention that basic belief in the articles of faith is rationally appropriate need not render him an “externalist” about epistemic justification.
1 Plantinga, Alvin, ‘Reason and Belief in God’ in Wolterstorff, Nicholas and Plantinga, Alvin, ed. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (London: Notre Dame UP, 1983), pp. 39-44; 55-9.Google Scholar
2 Plantinga cites Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) I.6 as illustrative.
3 In Symb. Apost. Prol.; STIIIa43.1 resp.
4 Plantinga, Alvin, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: OUP, 2000), p. 82 n7.Google Scholar
5 Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’. In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga argues that basic Christian beliefs also possess warrant, if Christianity is true.
6 Since what Aquinas means by “instinct” may somewhat diverge from its meaning in other contexts, I will use the term “instinctus” to refer to the cognitive mechanism which Aquinas has in mind.
7 I further characterise these competing conceptions of justification below.
8 Brent, James, ‘The Epistemic Status of Belief in Thomas Aquinas’ (PhD diss. St. Louis University, 2008), pp. 238-9.Google Scholar
9 Brent, James, ‘Aquinas’ in Abraham, William J., ed. The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2017), pp. 408-420, especially pp. 415-6.Google Scholar
10 Brent, ‘Epistemic Status’, pp. 215-6; 238-9; 251-2. Cf. Brent, ‘Aquinas’, pp. 415-6.
11 Niedebacher, Bruno, ‘The Relation of Reason to Faith’ in Davies, Brian and Stump, Eleonore, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp. 337-345; p. 345.Google Scholar
12 E.g. Ross, James, ‘Aquinas on Belief and Knowledge’ in Frank, William and Etzkorn, Gerard Essays Honoring Frank B. Wolter (New York: Franciscan Inst., 1985), pp. 245-269Google Scholar; Stump, Eleonore, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 367-70Google Scholar; Wynn, Mark, ‘Religious Faith’ in Oppy, Graham, ed. The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (London, Routledge: 2015), pp/ 167-79Google Scholar; Cross, Richard, ‘Testimony, Error and Reasonable Belief in Medieval Religious Epistemology’ in Benton, Matthew et al. ed. New Insights in Religious Epistemology (Oxford: OUP, 2018), pp. 29-52.Google Scholar
13 Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (DV) 14.3 ad9; Summa Theologiae (ST) IaIIae64.1, IIaIIae6a1.
14 STIIaIIae 6.1.
15 STIIaIIae1.1.
16 DV 14.2 ad9.
17 STIIaIIae 1.2, resp.
18 DV 14.10 ad10, STIIaIIae 5.2, resp.
19 DV 14.11 resp.; STIIIIae 2.7-8.
20 STIIaIIae5.3 resp.
21 DV 14.1 resp; STIIaIIae 2.1 resp.
22 Scientia differs from modern understandings of “knowledge”. Cf. Jenkins, John, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), pp. 1; 15-17.Google Scholar
23 STIIaIIae 6.1.
24 Expositio Super Librum, Boethii De Trinitate (Boe.) 3.1 ad4; DV14.1 resp; STIIaIIae 2.1 ad3.
25 Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum (In Sent.) I q.1art.3qc2ad2; Boe. 2.2 resp.; DV 28.a4ad8.
26 Boe. 2.3.1 ad5; ST IIaIIae 2.4 resp.
27 E.g. Penelhum, Terrence ‘The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas Aquinas’, Religious Studies 13 (2) (1977), pp. 133-154Google Scholar; Swinburne, Richard, Faith and Reason 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2005), pp. 34-36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
28 SCG I, 6.
29 Cf. Brent, ‘Epistemic Status’, p. 98ff.
30 Super Evangelium Johannis (In Jn).C9, L1; Quaestiones Quodlibetales (Quodl.) 2.4 ad6.
31 DV 14.10 ad11. Translated in Mulligan, Robert et al. trans. Truth (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).Google Scholar
32 DV 14.10 ad 11; SCG I, 6; STIIaIIae 2.9 ad3.
33 SCG III.154.8; STIIaIIae 1.4 ad2.
34 ST translations are from English Dominican Province, trans. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas 2nd rev. edn. (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1922-35).Google Scholar
35 Thus Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith, 167.
36 Thus Shanley, Brian, The Thomist Tradition (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2002), 25-6Google Scholar; Jenkins, Faith and Knowledge 165; Davies, Brian, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 283.Google Scholar
37 Jenkins, Faith and Knowledge, p. 169.
38 Given by e.g. Ambrose Gardeil (cf. Dulles, Avery, The Assurance of Things Hoped For: A Theology of Christian Faith (New York: OUP, 1994), pp. 106-7)Google Scholar and Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald in The Theological Virtues: Volume One: On Faith. (St. Louis: Herder, 1965), e.g. pp. 181-5.Google Scholar
39 In Jn C.15 L5 2055., ST IIaIIae 10.1 ad1; 2.9 ad3.
40 Qdl. II.4.1, resp.
41 Ibid. ad3.
42 In Jn C4 L5; ST IIaIIae 2.10 resp., IIIa 55.5 ad3.
43 STIIaIIae2.9 ad3; In Gal. C15 L4.
44 Super Ad Romanos (In Rom.) C10 L2.
45 In Rom C1 L4; C8 L6; Super Evangelium Matthaei (In Matt.) C4 L2.
46 STIaIIae 68.1, resp., quoting Eud. Ethics VII.8.
47 Qdl.II.4.1 ad2; In Rom. C15 L5.
49 Seckler, Max, Instinkt und Glaubenwille nach Thomas von Aquin (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald-Verlag, 1961), pp. 19-68.Google Scholar
50 SCG III.120.24; De Malo 3.4 contra.
51 STIIaIIae 95.7 resp.
52 STIIaIIae 95.7 resp. Aquinas compares the instinctus fidei to animal instinct in In Rom C8 L6.
53 STIa.78.4 resp.
54 STIIaIIae171.5, resp.
55 In Sent. IV Dist.49 q5 art3 sol.1 ad3.
56 STIIaIIae185.2 ad3.
57 Brent, ‘Epistemic Status’, p. 230.
58 Walgrave, Jan, ‘Instinctus Spiritus Sancti: een proeve tot Thomas-interpretatie’, Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses, 45 ( 3 ) (1969), pp. 417-431Google Scholar; p. 420.
59 STIa78.4; 83.1.
60 The lumen fidei is (an aspect of?) the habit of faith (Boe. 3.1 ad4; STIIaIIae 1.4 ad3) and the instinctus leads to its adoption (In Jn C6.L4, 919).
61 STIIaIIae 1.5 ad1.
62 STIIaIIae 2.3 ad 2.
63 Brent, ‘Aquinas’, p. 415; ‘Epistemic Status’, pp. 229-32.
64 Bergmann, Michael, Justification Without Awareness (New York: OUP, 2006), pp. 3-13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
65 E.g. Brent, ‘Epistemic Status, p. 245; Niedebacher, ‘The Relation of Reason’, pp. 343-5; see also the citations in note 10, above.
66 Warrant is the property which converts true belief into knowledge. For a summary of Plantinga's account, cf. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 56.
67 Brent, ‘Epistemic Status’, pp. 238-9; p. 243.
68 Since as suggested, the instinctus provides religious beliefs with “externalist” justification, Aquinas’ account of faith's rationality should be acceptable to both internalists and externalists alike.
69 Whilst I focus on the initial justification of converts’ beliefs by the interior instinctus, my remarks apply equally to the ongoing justification of a believer's faith by the lumen fidei.
70 I use these terms synonymously.
71 Jenkins, Faith and Knowledge, p. 200 makes a similar suggestion, but implausibly claims that this appearance is instilled by the gifts of understanding and knowledge rather than the interior instinctus.
72 See Huemer, Michael, ‘Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition’, American Philosophical Quartertly 43 (2006), pp. 147-158 ;Google Scholar Tucker, Chris, ‘Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism’, Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010), pp. 529-545.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
73 Huemer, Michael, ‘Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition’, p. 148.Google Scholar
74 Tucker, Chris, ‘Seemings and Justification: An Introduction’ in Tucker, Chris, ed. Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism (New York: OUP, 2013), pp. 3-5.Google Scholar
75 Dougherty, Trent, ‘Faith, Trust, and Testimony: An Evidentialist Account’ in Callahan, Laura and O'Connor, Timothy ed. Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, 101.Google Scholar
76 Tollhurst, William, ‘Seemings’, American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3) (1998), pp. 293-301; 298-9.Google Scholar
77 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 110.
78 For PC as internalist, cf. Huemer, ‘Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition’.
79 Cf. Contributions by Steup, Conee and Feldman in Tucker ed., Seemings and Justification.
80 Boe.3.1 ad4.
81 Though perhaps, as with animal instinct, without specifying the goodness at which faith aims.
82 Brent, ‘Epistemic Status’, p. 228,
83 DV 14.9 ad 4; STIIaIIae 5.2.
84 STIIaIIae5.2 resp. But cf. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith, pp. 170-2.
85 Qdl. II.4.1 ad2.
86 In Jn C4 L6, 662.
87 Ibid. translated in Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on the Gospel of John. Chapters 1-5, trans. Larcher, Fabian et al. (Washington D.C.: CUA, 2010), p. 241.Google Scholar
88 I.e. because of the teaching of Christ himself, who is Prima Veritas. Aquinas cannot mean that it immediately appears to believers that the gospel is true, because their assent would lack the formal object of faith.
89 STIIaIIae1.1.
90 Brent, ‘Epistemic Status’, p. 127.
91 In Div. Nom. C7 L5., translated by Brent, ‘Epistemic Status’, p. 127.
92 Again, presumably the idea should not be that it immediately appears to the believer that what the preachers teach is true, for then they will not believe with faith.
93 Brent, ‘Epistemic Status’, pp. 242-3.
94 STIIaIIae171.5, resp.
95 Ibid., resp.
96 Ibid., obj. 1.
97 Contra Doctrinam Retrahentium a Religione, 9.
98 “Virtutem igitur spiritus sancti vel ignorat vel ei resistere nititur qui a spiritu sancto motum diuturnitate consilii detinere contendit.” “Therefore, one who moved by the Holy Spirit, attempts to delay [action] for a long period of counsel, is either unaware of [or, ignores] the power of the Holy Spirit, or tries to resist it”. Ibid. (my translation).
99 Pickavé, Martin, ‘Human Knowledge’ in Davies and Stump ed. The Oxford Handbook of Thomas Aquinas, p. 313.Google Scholar
100 Cf. Kretzmann, Norman, ‘Infallibility, Error, Ignorance’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Vol. 17 (1991) pp. 159-194.Google Scholar
101 In Jn C15 L5, 2055.
102 For goodness as teleological, cf. Stump, Aquinas, pp. 62-7.
103 STIa62.1.
104 DV 14.2, resp.; 27.2, resp.; STIaIIae 62.1 resp.
105 STIaIIae3.8.
106 STIIaIIae 5.5.
107 This traditional reading is heavily contested, but see Feingold, Lawrence, The Natural Desire to See God According to Aquinas and His Interpreters (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2010).Google Scholar
108 Boe. 3.1 resp.; SCG1.4; STIa1.1.
109 DV 14.1 resp.
110 Super I ad Corinthianos (In 1 Cor.) C15 L2.
111 In 1 Cor. C15 L2, 920.
112 STIIaIIae3.1-2.
113 1 Cor 15:19.
114 In 1 Cor. C15 L2, 922-5.
115 Ibid. 925.
116 Plantinga, ‘The Prospects for Natural Theology’, Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), pp. 287-315; pp. 311-2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
117 With thanks to Ben Page for comments on a draft of this article.
