¹ ‘Primacy’ is being used here to indicate the ‘state of holding the highest place or rank within a given order, and/or the state of being logically or chronologically first,’ Carol, J., Why Jesus Christ: Thomistic, Scotistic and Conciliatory Perspectives (Manassas, VI.: Trinity Communications, 1986), p. 5Google Scholar.

² See a review of the history of this discussion by Jager, O., ‘Is de incarnatie méér dan ‘een noodmaatregel?,’’ in Rondom het Woord (10e jaargang 1, Jan., 1968), 73–76Google Scholar.

³ Mascall, E.L., Christian Theology and Natural Science (London: Green and Co, 1956), p. 45Google Scholar.

⁴ See Lewis, D., Counterfactuals (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973Google Scholar); Plantinga, A., The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974)Google Scholar; Konyndyk, K., Introductory Modal Logic (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986Google Scholar); and Adams, R.M., ‘Possible Worlds,’ The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edn. ed. Audi, R. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 724Google Scholar.

⁵ Suh, C.W., The Creation‐Mediatorship of Jesus Christ: A Study in the Relation of the Incarnation and the Creation (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982Google Scholar).

⁶ He speaks of it in his Commentary on the Sentences (1253–1258), In III Sent., d. 1, a. 3; in his Commentary on the First Epistle to Timothy, In 1 Tim., c. 1, lect. 4; and in the most comprehensive and final form in the Summa theologiae, pt III, q. 1, art. 3.

⁷ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt III, q. 1, art. 3 (italics mine). The entire section is important and should be considered. A few comments are in order. Aquinas is adamant in the extended passage that God could have become incarnate even if Adam had not sinned. Second, Aquinas states quite clearly that the opinion of an incarnation non‐contingent on the fall of Adam is plausible, but for his part, not probable. Third, according to many Thomistic scholars, the entire tenor of Aquinas’ theology is not inherently christocentric but theocentric. This means that it was not, according to Aquinas, the original intention of God to sum up all things in Christ as the head of creation. This is a post‐lapsarian condition only. ‘That is to say, while there was first an order of grace which did not include Christ, after the Fall such an order had its end in Christ, without any substantial modification having intervened,’ Pancheri, F.X., The Universal Primacy of Christ (Front Royal, Va.: 1984), p. 28Google Scholar, cited in Carol, J., Why Jesus Christ: Thomistic, Scotistic and Conciliatory Perspectives (Manassas, VI.: Trinity Communications, 1986), p. 11Google Scholar. This is what is known as the Thomistic thesis: the primary reason for the incarnation was the fall of humanity thus there would not have been an incarnation of the eternal Son had there been no sin to occasion it.

⁸ See Carol, Why Jesus Christ, pp. 23–34; 35–41 and 81–85. Carol also includes twenty‐four contemporaries of Aquinas who agree with his thesis, and a further fourteen authors in the 14th and 15th centuries. Carol then surveys eightyfour Thomists of the seventeenth century, the most important include Joseph Ragusa (d.1624), Commentariorum ac disputationum in Tertiam partem D. Thomae tomus unus sacra Incarnati Verbi mysteria pertractans, q. 1, a. 3 and Gabriel Vazquez (d. 1604), In 111 Patrem Summae, q. 1, a. 3, disp. X, c. IV‐V.

⁹ Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 86.

¹⁰ See Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. III, d. 7, q. 3, Wadding edition (Lyons: 1939; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1968–69). For an overview see Suh, The Creation‐Mediatorship of Jesus Christ,13–33.

¹¹ Scotus, Ordination, III (suppl.) d. 19; cod. Assisi com. 137, fol. 161v, cited in Carol, Why Jesus Christ, 124–125, where Carol provides notes on the authenticity or otherwise of this text. Whether it is Scotus's work or not it is unquestionably Scotistic.

¹² This is my paraphrase of the logic contained in Opus Parisiense, Lib. III, d. 7, q. 4, cited in J. Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 127. For Carol's elaboration of a Scotsitic signa rationis see Why Jesus Christ, pp. 135–149.

¹³ Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. 20, q. 2, n.2, Wadding edn. (Lyons: 1639, reprinted, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1968–69), 6.2:822.

¹⁴ Scotus, Ordinatio Lib. III, d. 32, n. 6 Wadding edn. 7.2:692.

¹⁵ Bissen, J., De praedestinatione absoluta Christi secundum Duns Scotum exposition doctrnalis, in Antonianum 12 (1937), 11Google Scholar, cited in Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 235.

¹⁶ In a provocative statement Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 254, goes so far as to assert that: For our part…we submit that if St. Thomas had lived long enough to examine the reasons marshalled by Duns Scotus in defense of his thesis, the Angelic Doctor would have enthusiastically embraced it; and this for the very good reason that the Franciscan vision is eminently grounded on the principles of the philosophia perennis which he himself has so brilliantly championed.

When Aquinas says that ‘the less noble is for the sake of the more noble’ (Aquinas, Summa theologia, I, q. 65, a. 2), or ‘the imperfect is for the sake of the more perfect’ (Aquinas, Summa theologia, I, q. 105, a. 5), he is saying that the more noble and more perfect is always the final cause properly so‐called of the less noble and less perfect. Since Jesus Christ is unquestionably the most perfect and noble in the entire hierarchy of creation – the Opus summum Dei, as Scotus styled him (Scotus, Opus Paris, III, d. 7, q. 4) – we must conclude that Jesus Christ is the final cause of all creation, that everything has been created for his sake, as Col 1.16 teaches. Aquinas also taught that ‘the better a thing is in its effects, the greater its priority in the intention of the agent’ (Aquinas, Summa Contra gentes, lib. 2, c. 44, a. 1). Owing to the intrinsic dignity and excellence of the hypostatic union, the man Jesus Christ must have been ontologically first in the mind of the Agent. And if he is first, then he must also be the cause of all those that follow, according to the other metaphysical axiom stated by Aquinas, ‘That which is first in any genus is the cause of all that follow’ (Aquinas, Summa theologia, III, q. 56, a. 1).

¹⁷ Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. III, d. 7, q. 3, cited in Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 246.

¹⁸ For commentary on these and other verses see Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 168.

¹⁹ This point is made clear by Carol, Why Jesus Christ, 147.

²⁰ This modified or ‘neo‐Scotist’ position is adapted from the works of Marshner, W.H., A Logician's Reflections on the Debitum Contrahendi Peccatum, in Marian Studies 29 (1978)Google Scholar, and Marian Studies 30 (1980), pp. 187–189Google Scholar; Bonnefoy, J.F., Christ and the Cosmos (Paterson: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1965)Google Scholar; and Meilach, M., The Primacy of Christ (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1964Google Scholar).

²¹ There are a variety of intermediate views which fall somewhere between the Thomistic and Scotistic theses, most notably those of Molina Luis (d. 1601), Commentaria in Primam Divi Thomae Partrem…, q. XXIII, a. IV‐V, disp, I. membr. VII‐VIII, ed. Venetiis (1594), I, 333–339; Francisco Suárez (d. 1617), de Incarnatione, disp. V, sect. 4, n. 4, Opera omnia, XVII, ed. Vivès (Paris, 1860), 239; and Rocca, Gesualdo M. and Roschini, Gabriel M., de ratione primaria existentiae Christi et Deiparae (Romae, 1944)Google Scholar.

²² Carol, Why Jesus Christ, 466.

²³ Scotus was an advocate of and master at modal logic so it is no wonder he applied his thesis to an equally logical hypothesis. See Normore, C.G., ‘Duns Scotus's Modal Theory,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Williams, T. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 129–160Google Scholar.

²⁴ Weinandy, T.G., In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), 135–148Google Scholar; and ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ The Cord 51 no.1 (2001), 27–38Google Scholar.

²⁵ See http://www.motherofgod.org/ (accessed 26.7.06).

²⁶ The topic has been treated in Berkouwer, G.C., The Work of Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), 19–34Google Scholar, who rejects the idea outright on similar grounds to Weinandy. Berkouwer argues that the Scotistic hypothesis separates the incarnation from the cross and results in a diminishment of the latter.

²⁷ Col 1.15–20 is considered by many exegetes to be the locus classicus for the cosmological aspect of christology or the mediatorship of Jesus Christ. See a critical exegesis and survey of different interpretations of this text in relation to our present concern in Suh, The Creation‐Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, 255–290. Other significant texts cited by Weinandy include Eph 1.3–14; Phil 2.5–11; and the Book of Revelation.

²⁸ Weinandy, ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ p. 37.

²⁹ Weinandy, ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ p. 37.

³⁰ Weinandy, In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh, p 137.

³¹ Weinandy, ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ p. 27.

³² Weinandy, ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ p. 27.

³³ See Habets, M., ‘Spirit Christology: Seeing in Stereo,’ Journal of Pentecostal Theology 11 no. 2 (2003), pp. 199–235CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁴ For his trinitarian contributions see especially The Father's Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995Google Scholar).

³⁵ See Calvin, J., The Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559), ed. McNeill, J.T., trans. Battles, F.L. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960)Google Scholar, 1.15.3; 2.12.1; 2.12.4. It appears that Calvin believed the sin of humanity was not the primary cause of the incarnation but rather the efficient cause, thus making him sympathetic to the broad Scotistic thesis outlined here, while firmly rejecting the Scotistic hypothesis of an incarnation irrespective of the fall. According to Calvin the primary reason for the incarnation was to glorify the Father in the Son and to bridge the epistemic and ontological divide between Creator and creature. This view of Calvin is confirmed when, in 2.12.1, we read: ‘The situation would surely have been hopeless had the very majesty of God not descended to us, since it was not in our power to ascend to him…Even if man had remained free from all stain, his condition would have been too lowly for him to reach God without a Mediator.’

³⁶ Barth, K., Church Dogmatics. 4vols. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956–1975)Google Scholar, II/1, 616. (Hereafter CD.)

³⁷ In Jesus Christ eternity and time have a ‘fellowship’ (koinonia) with one another. Barth, CD II/1, 616.

³⁸ Hunsinger, G., ‘Mysterium Trinitatis: Karl Barth's Conception of Eternity,’ in Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), p. 202Google Scholar.

³⁹ See an overview of Barth's theology of time and eternity in CD II/1, pp. 608–640.

⁴⁰ According to Barth eternity corresponds to perfection, and time with imperfection. Eternity is the perfect archetype and prototype of time, whereas time is merely the imperfect copy of eternity. This is explained in Hunsinger, ‘Mysterium Trinitatis,’ p. 198. See an overview of Barth's theology of time and eternity in CD II/1, pp. 608–640.

⁴¹ Hunsinger, ‘Mysterium Trinitatis,’ p. 204.

⁴² Hunsinger, ‘Mysterium Trinitatis,’ p. 204. Hunsinger goes on to comment that ‘He does so, however, in a remarkably Thomistic way. Although Barth disagreed with the standard Thomistic understanding of nature and grace as applied to sin, he agreed with it as applied to transitoriness. Barth agreed with Aquinas, in other words, that in the work of healing time, grace does not destroy nature, but rather perfects and exceeds it’ (pp. 204–205).

⁴³ Barth, CD II/1, p. 622.

⁴⁴ Other arguments in favour of Barth's support for the Scotistic thesis would include: 1) the eternal election of the man Jesus Christ and his theology on the ‘humanity of God,’ 2) the epistemological and ontological barriers Barth considers need to be bridged and can only be achieved by Jesus Christ, and 3) Barth's incarnational christology.

⁴⁵ See the discussion in Suh, The Creation‐Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, p. 38.

⁴⁶ This is developed throughout Barth, CD III/1, pp. 94–228.

⁴⁷ This is developed throughout Barth, CD III/1, pp. 42–329.

⁴⁸ Suh, The Creation‐Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, 66. Suh bases this largely upon his reading of Barth, CD IV/1, pp. 22–66.

⁴⁹ Suh, The Creation‐Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, p. 69.

⁵⁰ Barth, CD IV/1, p. 37.

⁵¹ Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 116. Moltmann does not mention Aquinas or Scotus directly but traces the question immediately back to J. Müller, ‘Ob der Sohn Gottes Mensch geworden sein würde, wenn das menschliche Geschlecht ohne Sünde geblieben ware?’Texte zur Kirchen‐und Theologiegeschichte, ed. J. Wirsching (Güttersloh, 1968).

⁵² Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 115.

⁵³ Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 115. We see this view explicitly affirmed in the work of A. Van Ruler who conceives the incarnation as God's emergency measure. The incarnation is thus exclusively a means for the restoration of the fallen creation. When the goal is achieved, the means is no longer needed. The conclusions of Van Ruler are that the incarnation will be liquidated in the eschaton. See Ruler, A.A. Van, ‘De Verhouding can het kosmologische en het eschatologische element in de Christolgie,’ in Theologisch Werk (Nijkerk: G.F. Callenbach, 1969)Google Scholar, deel I, p. 165; De evolutie van het dogma: ThW II, p. 53; Theologie van het apostat, p. 32; Die Christliche Kirche und das Alte Testament, p. 65. All citations from Suh, The Creation Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, p. 212 (see pp. 212–235 for a full commentary on Van Ruler's position).

Moltmann specifically critiques this position of Van Ruler in his The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 259–262Google Scholar. Interestingly, Moltmann sees this same tendency, this same ‘functional Christology,’ in the theology of John Calvin. While grossly overstated Moltmann argues that for Calvin once redemption has been completely mediated in the eschaton, and all things are handed back to the Father by the Son, then there will no longer be need for mediation so the Mediator – Jesus Christ – retreats back into the Trinity and direct communion with God (trinity) is achieved (see Calvin, J., Commentary on Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, 15.28Google Scholar). Moltmann, J., The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 257–259Google Scholar. Further, Moltmann reads Dorothy Sölle (Christ the Representative[SCM, 1967]) in the same vein. Based on his reading of Sölle Moltmann believes that when the function of representation, which is inherently for a limited time, is exhausted in the eschaton, then too the representative will be exhausted.

⁵⁴ Moltmann does not mention Aquinas or Scotus directly but traces the question immediately back to Müller, J., ‘Ob der Sohn Gottes Mensch geworden sein würde, wenn das menschliche Geschlecht ohne Sünde geblieben ware?’ Texte zur Kirchen‐und Theologiegeschichte, ed. Wirsching, J. (Güttersloh, 1968)Google Scholar. See Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 115, fn.28.

⁵⁵ Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 116.

⁵⁶ Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 117.

⁵⁷ Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 117.

⁵⁸ Torrance, T.F., The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), p. 210Google Scholar. In his Auburn Lectures at the start of his academic career Torrance had asserted the direct opposite to this. See Torrance, T.F., The Doctrine of Jesus Christ: Auburn Lectures 1938–39 (Eugene, Or.: Wipf & Stock, 2002), p. 154Google Scholar. His thought thus developed considerably in this area, largely due to his later interest in Athanasian theology, contingency, and the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ.

⁵⁹ More points could be added such as the redemption of time, for example. But we have limited the discussion here to the main emphases of Torrance's theology. One other argument necessitating Torrance's broadly Scotistic position is his use of the concept of contingency. Contingency plays a major part in Torrance's scientific dogmatics and so it should not be a surprise that contingency is linked to modal logic in philosophical reasoning which itself is linked to possible worlds semantics. Torrance has said the world is contingent simply because God did not need to create it. This immediately presupposes that there is more than one possible world. If God could choose to create or not to create, then there are at least two possible worlds: the world in which God does create this particular universe and the one in which he does not. A logical corollary of accepting divine contingency is a commitment to the Scotistic thesis. In Torrance's work after the 1960's we see him working out the scientific structures of theology more rigorously than he could have anticipated in his early Auburn Lectures. If one had the opportunity to ask Thomas Torrance if what is happening in philosophy today with its interest in essentialism is what his own scientific dogmatics had anticipated would he reply positively in the way Barth did when Torrance pointed out to him how contemporary science conformed to Barth's own theological science, even though he was unaware of it at the time? See Richards, J.W., The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity and Immutability (Downers Grove: IVP, 2003), 82–105Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Torrance, The Doctrine of Jesus Christ, p. 137. With this quotation we find a hint as to the necessity of the incarnation due to creational space‐time.

⁶¹ Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, p. 115. Italics in original.

⁶² Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, p. 116.

⁶³ Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, pp. 116–117.

⁶⁴ See Nellas, P., Deification in Christ, trans. Russell, N. (1979. Crestwood, NY.: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1987), p. 35Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ See Campbell, J.M., The Nature of the Atonement (1856Google Scholar. Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1996), p. 19.

⁶⁶ For a number of contemporary proposals supporting this thesis see: Staniloae, D., ‘Image, Likeness, and Deification in the Human Person,’ Communio 13 (1986), pp. 64–83Google Scholar; Pannenberg, W., Systematic Theology, vol. 2, trans. Bromiley, G.W. (GrandRapids: Eerdmans, 1994), pp. 218–231Google Scholar; and Grenz, S.J., ‘Jesus as the Imago Dei: Image‐of‐God Christology and the Non‐linear Linearity of Theology,’ Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 47 no. 4 (2004), pp. 617–628Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Torrance refers the reader to Torrance, J.B., and Walls, R.C., John Duns Scotus Doctor of the Church (Edinburgh: 1992), p. 9Google Scholar, and Mackenzie, I., The Atonement of Time (Norwich, 1994)Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ On the idea of probation see Hodge, C., Systematic Theology: Vol. 2: Anthropology (reprint: Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 117–122Google Scholar; and Berkhof, L., Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1939), 215–218Google Scholar. The covenant idea is also worked out in a unique way by Barth. See Suh, The Creation‐Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, pp. 34–37, who argues that according to Barth the creation was brought about for the sake of the covenant, and the covenant was concluded for the sake of reconciliation. See further at pp. 56–61.

⁶⁹ Athanasius, Letter 60, to Adelphus, 4, in NPNF, 2nd series, 4. pp. 1334–1340.

⁷⁰ What is not being argued is the impossibility of the other two divine persons being incarnated. In agreement see Aquinas, Summa Theologiae III, q.23, a. 2., who argues there is nothing that would restrict the possible incarnation of the Father or the Holy Spirit as all three share the same eternal divine nature. Duns Scotus argued along similar lines in his Opera omnia, L. III, d. 1, t, 2. Within Scripture we read of the Father and the Spirit's active presence within the creation. The language of Scripture suggests that God the Father can assume finite form within the order of creation (i.e. ‘the Ancient of Days,’‘He who sits upon the Throne’) — as can the Spirit (‘like a dove’). See Funkenstein, A., ‘The Body of God in 17th Century Theology and Science,’ in Millenarianism and Messianism in English Literature and Thought 1650–1800, ed. Popkin, R.H. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 150–175Google Scholar; and Jenson, R.W., ‘The Body of God's Presence: A Trinitarian Theory,’ in Creation, Christ and Culture: Studies in Honour of T. F. Torrance, ed. McKinney, R.W. A. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1976), 85–91Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Rahner goes further and rejects the idea a divine person other than the Son could become incarnate for this would, in his opinion, threaten the axiom that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice‐versa. Rahner, K., Schriften zur Theologie (Einsiedeln‐Zürich‐Kōln: Benzinger Verlag, 1960)Google Scholar, 1. p. 203; 4. p. 138; Grundkurs des Glaubens. Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums (Freiburg‐Basel‐Wien: Herder, 1976), p. 213Google Scholar; The Trinity, trans. Donceel, J. (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 22–33Google Scholar; and Theological Investigations vol. 4: More Recent Writings, trans. Smyth, K. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), pp. 90–107Google Scholar.

⁷² Barth, CD IV/1, p. 66. O’Collins, G., ‘The Incarnation – The Critical Issues,’ in The Incarnation, eds. Davis, S.T., Kendall, D., and O’Collins, G. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 22Google Scholar, overemphasises his point but helpfully concludes: ‘In short, where inner‐trinitarian relations undoubtedly rule out the possible incarnation of the Father, the economy of salvation succeeds better in ruling out the possible incarnation of the Spirit.’