¹ Weigel, George. The Price of Peace (Cambridge University Press, 2007)Google Scholar

² Weigel makes no attempt to distinguish the precise force of ‘moral’ and ‘morally’ in this claim. Since for nine cases out of ten of his examples the term ‘moral’ can be simply be left out without loss of sense, one wonders what conception of ethics underlies his whole approach to just war. (See below, Note 6)

³ Bobbitt, Philip, The Shield of Achilles (Allen Lane, 2002)Google Scholar, Prologue pp. xxiff

⁴ This fact marks a serious shortcoming of James Turner Johnson's contribution to The Price of Peace. He is right in pointing out that recent Catholic and liberal Protestant thinking in the USA has failed to follow the historical tradition of just war theory. But he himself fails to address the need for this tradition to develop in the light of unprecedented twenty-first century conditions. What is clearly needed is for this tradition to develop authentically in order to address situations today, while retaining its underlying validity. This is why it needs something like the criteria for authentic development worked out by Newman for Christian doctrine generally. (On this, see my article on the subject, entitled International Law: Idea or Reality in Law and Justice No 154, Hilary/Easter 2005, pp. 35-56Google Scholar).

⁵ Clausewitz, On War Chapter 1:2. See below, footnote 10.

⁶ I have here twice left out the word ‘moral’/‘morally’, substituting dots instead, to show that the word ‘moral’ does no significant work in the sentence.

⁷ Just war after all begins with a concept of justice; and in so far as the in bello criteria are about the justice of the actions to be carried out, they have to be weighed from the very start. The criteria of just war are not like a set of exam papers in which a good mark on one can compensate for a bad mark in another: they are like the ingredients of a cake, which can only exist once all its ingredients are put together in the bowl.

⁸ This is a point also made by Bobbitt. But he argues that al-Qaeda is a kind of ‘market-state’ (op. cit. p. 820). This is surely wrong from his own point of view, in so far as the fundamental objective of the market-state is to ‘expand the opportunities offered to the public’ (op. cit. p. 222), whereas the fundamental objective of al-Qaeda is to restrict public choices. Helena Kennedy, referring to Bobbitt's argument (in Just Law, Chatto and Windus, 2004, pp. 44-5) thinks al-Qaeda is more like a multinational corporation than a state; a point which is close to Bobbit's in so far as Bobbit himself sees the ‘market-state’ as a kind of multinational corporation writ large (p. 221). But then a multinational corporation can also be a criminal gang (for example when it stoops to bribery to gain entry into the market).

⁹ Bobbitt claims that the network of which al-Qaeda is part has many of the features of a state (loc. cit. p. 820); but as note 8 above points out, even as a kind of market-state al-Qaeda fails the basic test of what it exists for. In the absence of the basic objective, the features Bobbitt mentions are mere trappings.

¹⁰ This point was essentially made by Aquinas when he wrote: ‘just as they (sc. those in authority) use the sword in lawful defence against domestic disturbance when they punish criminals … so they lawfully use the sword of war to protect the commonweal from foreign attacks’. (Summa Theologiae 2a2ae.40.1)

¹¹ One might have expected so ‘Clausewitzian’ a thinker as Weigel to have recognised that the essence of war is to ‘compel our enemy to do our will’ by making him powerless. (On War Chapter 1:2) This of course is quite different from policing criminals, where the object is to promote the rule of law.

¹² Bobbitt admits that it is possible to regard the modern problem as one of policing (pp. 466-7). But he thinks that events in Bosnia have shown this idea to be untenable. Yet it is not clear why the Bosnian debacle implies the end, rather than simply the failure, of policing. I think the weakness of Bobbitt's argument is that, as he admits, markets are not very interested in justice.

¹³ It is true that Weigel quotes NSS-2002 in terms of justifying pre-emptive action. But this is partly because of a wish to muddy the distinction (well established in law) between action to forestall an imminent attack (pre-emption) and action to forestall a possible future attack (prevention). Weigel tries to bring NSS-2002 into line with genuine just war thinking by substituting talk of ‘the first use of armed force’ where the original talks of ‘pre-emption’. But this does not work because the original itself fails adequately to distinguish between pre-emption and prevention. It rather wants to smuggle prevention in by the back door. The truth is that ‘pre-emptive’ action against an imminent, clearly perceived threat is allowable in international law. But ‘preventive’ action, that is action against a possible future threat, is contrary to such law because it is the proper work of the police, because (and only because) there is a mechanism for catching the would-be criminal and with luck bringing him before a judge. International law has no effective machinery for doing this. If it did, this would in itself make the arresting of the offender by soldiers into an act of policing, whatever the official status of the arresting officer is. David Rodin has made this point, when he says that ‘if you have reason to fear an unjust attack in the future, you should seek protection by the police or the courts’. (|The Ethics of War ed. By Richard Sorabji and David Rodin, Ashgate 2006, p. 173). The key point behind this argument is that the difference between war and policing is not one of degree, let alone mere semantics, but is a logical difference between action to win a contest and thereby forcing our opponent to do our will (war) and action to bring an opponent to justice within a framework of established and effective law. My further point is that today the world is hovering, out of necessity, and because of the illegitimacy of making war with modern weapons, on the brink of turning warfare into sheer criminality. ‘Asymmetric war’ is actually a misleading term used simply to describe a gigantic form of global crime by organised gangs such as al-Qaeda.

¹⁴ Weigel quotes Anne-Marie Slaughter (President of the American Society of International Law) in favour of preventive use of force, for example to prevent a state from acquiring weapons of mass-destruction. But on this side of the Atlantic lawyers tend to disagree with this opinion. See for example Philippe Sands and Helen Law, opinion provided to Greenpeace entitled: The United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent: Current and Future Issues of Legality p. 6:10. This opinion appeals to the authority of Lord Goldsmith, the UK Attorney General, in support of the distinction between pre-emptive and preventive uses of force.

¹⁵ The Price of Peace p. 224.

¹⁶ Of course, in so far as eating is a pleasure, some food will be simply pleasurable rather than physically nourishing. But then legitimate pleasure in due measure is itself a nourishment for the overall well-being of the eater.

¹⁷ We can't say ‘international community’ here, since nationality is not what a society of market-states is about. Hence I speak of ‘global’ community instead. For some theological reflections on the implications of this thought, see Radcliffe, Timothy OP, What is the Point of Being a Christian? (Continuum, 2005) chapters 8 – 11Google Scholar.