An interesting restriction on Norwegian identity-of-sense anaphoric reference when the anaphor occurs as second object is discussed. Fretheim (1974) proposed to account for this by a global rule constraining pronominalization in such contexts, and claimed that the necessity of this constraint renders any interpretive account of identity-of-sense anaphoric reference untenable. The present paper purports to demonstrate the contrary, that Fretheim's observations in fact provide support for an interpretive theory of identify-of-sense anaphora as far as Norwegian is concerned.

This article is a review of Thorstein Fretheim (ed.), Sentrale problemer i norsk syntaks, Universitetsforlaget 1997. The review groups together the papers by Even Hovdhaugen, Jan Engh and Thorstein Fretheim. It argues that these three papers largely fail to support the authors' claims because post-Aspects developments in transformational, generrative grammer are ignored. Also, specific analyses based on TG are proposed as alternatives to some analyses based on analogy. Finally, lars Hellan's contribution is examined in a rather detailed manner, and some counterproposals are sketched.