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How Amoral Is Hegemon?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2004

Robert E. Goodin
Robert E. Goodin
Affiliation:
Professor of social and political theory and philosophy at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He can be reached at goodinb@coombs.anu.edu.au.
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Extract

In the post–Cold War world, the last remaining superpower is almost hegemonic. Almost, but not quite. The United States cannot act entirely on its own. It needs—or thinks it needs, or pretends it needs—the support of at least a few other countries in almost anything it does. But it only needs a few, and many could serve equally well.An earlier version of this article was presented to the International Sociological Association World Congress, Brisbane, in August 2002. The author is grateful for comments, then and later, from Mattei Dogan, Christina Fong, Gerry Mackie, Claus Offe, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Dave Schmidtz, Duncan Snidal, and this journal's editors and referees

Type
PERSPECTIVES
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , March 2003 , pp. 123 - 126
Copyright
2003 by the American Political Science Association

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