Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-4hvwz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-25T13:45:54.316Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Climate Models and the Irrelevance of Chaos

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Corey Dethier
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Philosophy of science has witnessed substantial recent debate over the existence of a structural analogue of chaos, which is alleged to spell trouble for certain uses of climate models. The debate over the analogy can and should be separated from its alleged epistemic implications: chaos-like behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for small dynamical misrepresentations to generate erroneous results. The kind of sensitivity that matters in epistemology is one that induces unsafe beliefs, and the existence of a structural analogue to chaos is better seen as an explanation for known safety failures than as providing evidence for unknown ones.

Type
Computer Simulation and Computer Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 997 - 1007
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Roman Frigg for valuable comments on an earlier version of this article. The article also benefited greatly from conversations with Anjan Chakravartty and Wendy Parker.

References

Frigg, Roman, Bradley, Seamus, Du, Hailiang, and Smith, Leonard A.. 2014. “Laplace’s Demon and the Adventures of His Apprentices.” Journal of Philosophy 81 (1): 31–59.Google Scholar
Frigg, Roman, Smith, Leonard A., and Stainforth, David A.. 2013. “The Myopia of Imperfect Climate Models: The Case of UKCP09.” Philosophy of Science 80 (5): 886–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frigg, Roman, Smith, Leonard A., and Stainforth, David A.. 2015. “An Assessment of the Foundational Assumptions in High-Resolution Climate Projections: The Case of UKCP09.” Synthese 192 (12): 3919–4008.10.1007/s11229-015-0739-8CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodwin, William M., and Winsberg, Eric. 2016. “Missing the Forest for the Fish: How Much Does the ‘Hawkmoth Effect’ Threaten the Viability of Climate Projections?” Philosophy of Science 83 (5): 1122–32.10.1086/687943CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Humphreys, Paul. 2004. Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0195158709.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knutti, Reto, Furrer, Reinhard, Tebaldi, Claudia, Cermak, Jan, and Meehl, Gerald A.. 2010. “Challenges in Combining Projections from Multiple Climate Models.” Journal of Climate 25 (10): 2739–58.Google Scholar
Knutti, Reto, and Sedláček, Jan. 2013. “Robustness and Uncertainties in the New CMIP5 Climate Model Projections.” Nature Climate Change 3:369–73.10.1038/nclimate1716CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nabergall, Lukas, Navas, Alejandro, and Winsberg, Eric. 2019. “An Antidote for Hawkmoths: On the Prevalence of Structural Chaos in Non-linear Modeling.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (21): 1–28.10.1007/s13194-018-0244-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oreskes, Naomi, Stainforth, David A., and Smith, Leonard A.. 2010. “Adaptation to Global Warming: Do Climate Models Tell Us What We Need to Know?” Philosophy of Science 77 (5): 1012–28.10.1086/657428CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parker, Wendy S. 2020. “Model Evaluation: An Adequacy-for-Purpose View.” Philosophy of Science 87 (3): 457–77.10.1086/708691CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reed, Baron. 2000. “Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification.” Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198): 57–67.10.1111/1467-9213.00167CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, George E. 2002. “From the Phenomenon of the Ellipse to an Inverse-Square Force: Why Not?” In Reading Natural Philosophy, ed. Malament, David, 31–70. La Salle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Stainforth, David A., Allen, Myles R., Tredger, Edward R., and Smith, Leonard A.. 2007. “Confidence, Uncertainty and Decision-Support Relevance in Climate Predictions.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 365 (1857): 2145–61.Google ScholarPubMed
Staley, Kent W. 2004. “Robust Evidence and Secure Evidence Claims.” Philosophy of Science 71 (4): 467–88.10.1086/423748CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Werndl, Charlotte. 2009. “What Are the New Implications of Chaos for Unpredictability?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1): 195–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilhelm, Isaac. 2019. “Celestial Chaos: The New Logics of Theory-Testing in Orbital Dynamics.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science B 65:97–102.10.1016/j.shpsb.2018.10.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Winsberg, Eric. 2018. Philosophy and Climate Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/9781108164290CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Winsberg, Eric, and Goodwin, William M.. 2016. “The Adventures of Climate Science in the Sweet Land of Idle Arguments.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science B 54:9–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar