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A Confutation of Convergent Realism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly ‘naturalistic’ forms of scientific realism.
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle.
-H. Putnam (1975)
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- Research Article
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- Copyright
- Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I am indebted to all of the following for clarifying my ideas on these issues and for saving me from some serious errors: Peter Achinstein, Richard Burian, Clark Glymour, Adolf Grünbaum, Gary Gutting, Allen Janis, Lorenz Krüger, James Lennox, Andrew Lugg, Peter Machamer, Nancy Maull, Ernan McMullin, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Nicholas Rescher, Ken Schaffner, John Worrall, Steven Wykstra.
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