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Discussion: Confirmation, Paradox, and Logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Leif Eriksen
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Abstract

Paul Horwich has formulated a paradox which he believes to be even more virulent than the related Hempel paradox. I show that Horwich's paradox, as originally formulated, has a purely logical solution, hence that it has no bearing on the theory of confirmation. On the other hand, it illuminates some undesirable traits of classical predicate logic. A revised formulation of the paradox is then dealt with in a way that implies a modest revision of Nicod's criterion.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , December 1989 , pp. 681 - 687
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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