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Kordig's Paradox Objection to Radical Meaning Variance Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Peter Galle
Peter Galle*
Affiliation:
Capricornia Institute of Advanced Education, Queensland
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Abstract

In his book, The Justification of Scientific Change, Carl Kordig claims that the radical meaning variance view of Feyerabend and others becomes ensnared in a self-referential paradox. The accusation fails because it rests upon a confusion of that view with its “counterparts” in other linguistic/theoretical contexts.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , September 1983 , pp. 494 - 497
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1983

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Henry Krips and referees of this journal for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. My especial thanks go to Professor R. E. Butts for his encouragement of the metamorphosis of this paper.

References

Kordig, C. R. (1971), The Justification of Scientific Change. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.10.1007/978-94-010-1734-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar