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On an Inconsistency in Constructive Empiricism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay*
Affiliation:
Department of History & Philosophy, Montana State University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of History & Philosophy, Montana State University, Bozeman, MT 59717; e:mail: UHIPB@Trex.Oscs.Montana.edu
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Abstract

I show that van Fraassen's empiricism leads to mutually incompatible claims with regard to empirical theories. He is committed to the claim that reasons for accepting a theory and believing it are always identical, insofar as the theory in question is an empirical theory. He also makes a general claim that reasons for accepting a theory are not always reasons for believing it irrespective of whether the theory is an empirical theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 3 , September 1997 , pp. 511 - 514
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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Footnotes

‡

I presented this paper at the meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 1994. I wish to thank James Allard, John Bennett, Predrag Cicovaki, David Braun, James Cain, Scott DeVito, Richard Gallimore, Stephen Kershnar, Henry Kyburg Jr., Isaac Levi, Peter Lipton, Abhaya Nayak, Richard Otte, David Tabachnik, Bas van Fraassen, Charles Wallis, John Watkins, Paul Weirich, James Woodward, two anonymous referees (one of whom has suggested this change in the title of the paper), and the editor of this journal for suggestions. My special thanks are to John Bennett and Gordon Brittan Jr. for helping me sharpen my argument against constructive empiricism.

References

Earman, J. (ed.) (1983), Testing Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
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van Fraassen, B. (1991), Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0198239807.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar