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On the Logical Conditions of Deductive Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Jaegwon Kim
Jaegwon Kim*
Affiliation:
Swarthmore College
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Extract

Hempel and Oppenheim have stated in Part III of their paper “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” [2] a set of conditions for deductive explanation. However, their analysis has come under damaging systematic criticisms in a recent paper by Eberle, Kaplan and Montague [1], The principal aim of the present paper is to review the Hempel-Oppenheim analysis and propose a strengthened version of it that avoids the recent criticisms.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , July 1963 , pp. 286 - 291
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1963

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References

[1] Eberle, R., Kaplan, D. and Montague, R., “Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation”, Philosophy of Science 28 (1961), pp. 418–428.10.1086/287828CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Hempel, C. G. and Oppenheim, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, Philosophy of Science 15 (1948), pp. 135–175.10.1086/286983CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Kaplan, D., “Explanation Revisited”, Philosophy of Science 28 (1961), pp. 429–436.10.1086/287829CrossRefGoogle Scholar