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On Theory-Change and Meaning-Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Michael E. Levin
Michael E. Levin*
Affiliation:
The City College of the City University of New York
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Abstract

I argue against the currently popular view that a radical change in theory affects the meaning of theoretical terms, and hence render pre- and post-shift theories incomparable. I first show how to pose the meaning-change issue without appeal to meanings reified. I contend that arguments against theory-neutral observation languages are faulty, but that even if they were sound, there are semantic devices that allow a theory to refer to the factual basis of a competitor. This suggests a picture of science as the accumulation of truths, with each successive stage being more stable.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , September 1979 , pp. 407 - 424
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1979

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Footnotes

†

I wish to thank Martin Tamny, my wife Margarita, and an especially thorough referee, for their assistance.

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