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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
As presented by some, operationalism in sociology is Kantian in its view of the universe, of the assumptions and limitations of science, and of the scientist's ability to analyse and present the reality of the universe.
In his exposition, George A. Lundberg rests operationalism upon a twofold basis. First there is a materially-conceived nature. This is expressed in the terms “X,” “the cosmos,” or “that which arouses certain responses.” We do not know, cannot know, nor can science tell us, anything about the nature of this X, save that it precipitates responses. This position is qualified by making existence always relative to some responding organism. There is nothing final in the terms “existence” or “reality,” such as is usually implied in the terms “truth” and “fact.” An objective reality existing entirely independently of anyone's observations is believed by Lundberg to be incompatible with his philosophical basis. The only justification for this position is “… its demonstrable efficiency in helping us comprehend our world.”
1 Lundberg, George A., Foundations of Sociology, MacMillan, New York, 1939. References to this book will be Foundations.
2 Foundations, p. 17; pp. 9-10. He quotes P. W. Bridgman and A. P. Weiss in support of himself.
3 Op. cit., pp. 9-10. Italics and quotation marks Lundberg's. One may not agree with his conception of the cosmos being limited to a catalytic agent precipitating responses in man. This view of the cosmos is very similar to Kant's conception of “. … Nature, as the sum of the objects of experience.” (Critique of Pure Reason, preface to 2nd. ed., p. xxx, Meiklejohn trans., Bohn ed.)
4 Foundations, pp. 8-9.
5 Kant, Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik, Hartenstein ed., v. lv, s. 107. Quoted in F. A. Lange, History of Materialism, v. 2, pp. 162-163.
6 F. A. Lange, op. cit., v. 2, p. 29.
7 Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. by J. II. Bernard, ed. preface, p. xv.
8 Pure Reason, N. K. Smith abridged trans., p. 150.
9 Idem. Compare Lundberg's very similar thought: “… “Existence,” “reality,” the verb “is” as a mystical general designation, and a large number of similar words, are merely words designating behavior relationships. A part from this behavior, the words are without content for science.“ Foundations, p. 15. Italics supplied.
10 Kant, Pure Reason (Meiklejohn trans.), pp. xxvi-xxviii.
11 Foundations, pp. 5-8; 20; 12.
12 Op. cit., p. 17.
13 Op. cit., p. 251. Italics Lundberg's.
14 Op. cit., pp. 220-221.
15 Idem.
16 I am suggesting that Lundberg is unaware of the contradictory philosophical positions that he has taken. This section may be taken to apply generally to the operationism of Dewey and Bridgman, who, I believe, have followed this idealistic approach.
17 Op. cit., p. 84.
18 Op. cit., pp. 362, 251.
19 Op. cit., p. 41. Lundberg's discussion of international affairs shows one aspect of the misuse of operationism. He believes that “whole nations frequently fall upon each other with great ferocity” because of inadequate symbolic systems. One may remark that this view is enough to make one anti-semantic! Why does Lundberg fail to quote some of those sociologists who, he claims, analyse the social situation only in terms of Democracy and Communism? Is it because there are none?
20 Foundations, p. 60. Italics Lundberg's.
21 Op. cit., pp. 59, 84.
22 See the relevant sections in Mind, Self and Society, The Philosophy of the Present and The Philosophy of the Act.
23 Foundations, the section on “Dynamics of Behavior—General,” pp. 203 ff.
24 This may seem an arbitrary statement, but it is not intended as such. The conclusion is reached by a comparison of Kant with such students as Cooley and Mead.
