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Philosophy in Science: Some Personal Reflections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 May 2022

Elliott Sober*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Wisconsin—Madison, Madison, WI, US

Abstract

The task of Philosophy in Science (PinS) is to use philosophical tools to help solve scientific problems. This article describes how I stumbled into this line of work and then addressed several topics in philosophy of biology—units of selection, cladistic parsimony, robustness and trade-offs in model building, adaptationism, and evidence for common ancestry—often in collaboration with scientists. I conclude by offering advice for would-be PinS practitioners.

Type
Symposia Paper
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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