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Social Construction Revisited: Epistemology and Scientific Practice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Melinda B. Fagan
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Abstract

Philosophy of scientific practice aims to critically evaluate as well as describe scientific inquiry. Epistemic norms are required for such evaluation. Social constructivism is widely thought to oppose this critical project. I argue, however, that one variety of social constructivism, focused on epistemic justification, can be a basis for critical epistemology of scientific practice, while normative accounts that reject this variety of social constructivism (SCj) cannot. Abstract, idealized epistemic norms cannot ground effective critique of our practices. I propose a new approach, placing SCj within a general framework of social action theory. This framework can be used to explicate epistemic norms implicit in our scientific practices.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 1 , January 2010 , pp. 92 - 116
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Many thanks to Colin Allen, Jordi Cat, Hasok Chang, Carla Fehr, Tom Gieryn, Dick Grandy, Jim Griesemer, Noretta Koertge, Lisa Lloyd, Helen Longino, Fred Schmitt, Jutta Schickore, Miriam Solomon, Alison Wylie, Jack Zammito, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of Philosophy of Science for valuable comments and criticism during the writing of this article. Earlier versions were presented at the University of Western Ontario; Rice University; the University of California, Santa Cruz; the University of California, Davis; and at meetings of the British Society for Philosophy of Science (2008), the Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice (2009), Center for Philosophy of Science (&HPS1, Pittsburgh, 2007), and the Society for the History of Philosophy of Science (2008); I thank those audiences as well for their questions and criticisms. Funding was provided by a Chancellor's Fellowship and the Louise McNutt Dissertation Year Fellowship from Indiana University, a Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation (2006–2007), and a Mosle Research Fellowship from Rice University (2007–2008).

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