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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
At the beginning of the twentieth century, philosophy in America and England began to respond to the rumors of unrest and dissatisfaction which were under way at the close of the nineteenth century. Many contemporary thinkers, who have had occasion to look backward, have remarked on the dominance of idealism at the turn of the period. Montague says it was “rampant” and points to the organization of the St. Louis school by W. T. Harris, the purpose being a study of Hegelian thought. Lovejoy also remembers the total sweep of idealistic thought. “The metaphysics of the philosophical teachers whose influence was dominant in most of the American universities thirty-five years ago had one common and fundamental premise which was supposed to be established beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt; to question it was simply to betray one's want of a genuine initiation into philosophy. It was the proposition that, in Bradley's words, 'to be real, or even barely to exist, is to fall within sentience; sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real. There is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence.' As my first teacher in philosophy, George Holmes Howison, said, in summing up a memorable philosophical symposium in 1895: 'We are all agreed' in one 'great tenet;' which is 'the entire foundation of philosophy itself: the explanation of the world which maintains that the only thing absolutely real is mind; that all material and all temporal existences take their being from Consciousness that thinks and experiences; that out of consciousness they all issue, to the consciousness they are presented, and that presence to consciousness constitutes their entire reality.' With almost a whole generation of acute and powerful minds this passed for a virtual axiom.”
1 “The Story of American Realism,” Montague, Philosophy, Vol. XII, 1937, p. 140.
2 Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 85, A. O. Lovejoy.
3 May Sinclair, A Defense of Idealism, 1917, Intro. V.
4 W. H. Sheldon, “The Vice of Modern Philosophy,” Journal of Philosophy, etc., Vol. XII, 1915, p. 16.
5 Schaub, Philosophy Today, 1928, p. 24, 28.
6 Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism, 1930, p. 7.
7 Mind, N. S. Vol. XII, 1903.
8 In justice to Mr. Moore we should mention that when this article was reprinted in his Philosophical Studies he confessed that he thought the paper was very confused and embodied a good many downright mistakes. Preface, p. VIII.
9 A. K. Rogers, “The Neo-Hegelian ‘Self’ and Subjective Idealism,” Philosophical Review, Vol. X, 1903, and “Professor Royce and Monism,” Philosophical Review, Vol. XII, 1903.
10 The Hegelians referred to are Green, Watson, Caird, Dewey, Royce, Ritchie, Nettleship.
11 Ibid., p. 52.
12 Joseph Leighton, “The Final Ground of Knowledge,” Philosophical Review, Vol. XVII, 1908, pp. 389–390.
13 R. B. Perry, “The Ego-Centric Predicament,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VII, 1910.
14 Mary Whiton Calkins remarked, “The alleged oppositions of logic to idealism consist, in fact, in the selection of some empirical and subsidiary logical principle and in the demonstrations of its incompatibility with idealism. Perry's ego-centric predicament is the cleverest and most unblushing instance which I know.” “The Idealist to the Realist,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, p. 450.
15 “The Idealist to the Realist,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, 1911.
16 Ibid., p. 452.
17 “A Defense of Idealism,” Mind, N. S., Vol. XXIII, 1914, p. 473 ff.
18 Ibid., p. 486.
19 Ibid., p. 487. Ladd was probably right. Hocking in Types of Philosophy, revised edition 1939, Preface p. VII, says that one of the reasons for revising a text ten years old is the “disintegration of new realism as a school.”
20 E. S. Brightman, “Modern Idealism,” Journal of Philosophy, etc., Vol. XVII, 1920.
21 Ibid., p. 539.
22 Ibid., p. 539.
23 “Modern Idealism,” Brightman, Ibid., and N. K. Smith, “The Present Situation in Philosophy,” Phil. Rev., Vol. XXIX, 1920.
24 Contemporary Idealism in America, edited by C. Barrett, Macmillan, 1932. G. H. Palmer, C. M. Bakewéll, W. M. Urban, E. S. Brightman, G. W. Canningham, R. F. A. Hoernle, J. A. Leighton, J. E. Boodin, C. W. Hendel, R. A. Tsanoff, W. E. Hocking.
25 Ibid., Preface VII.
26 “Is Idealism Realism,” Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XXX, 1933.
27 “Is Idealism Realism? A Reply in Terms of Objective Idealism,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXX, 1933.
28 “The Definition of Idealism,” Ibid. This was from the personalistic viewpoint.
29 “Is Idealism Incurably Ambiguous?” Ibid. This was from the humanistic point of view. Schiller reduced twelve forms of idealism to humanism.
30 “What is Speculative Idealism,” Ibid.
31 “The Objectivity of Mind,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXI, 1934.
32 “The Organic Unity of Philosophy,” Ibid., p. 183.
33 “Idealism, Mentalistic and ‘Speculative,‘” Ibid.
34 “Professor Pratt on Speculative Philosophy,” Ibid.
35 “Once More Unto the Breach,” Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XXXI, 1934.
36 Ibid., p. 215.
37 American Thought, H. Holt, 1923.
38 Ibid., p. 281.
39 Personal Idealism, ed. by Henry Sturt, 1902.
40 G. F. Stout, F. C. S. Schiller, W. R. Boyce Gibson, C. E. Underhill, R. R. Marett, Henry Sturt, F. W. Bussell, Hastings Rashdall.
41 Ibid., p. 5.
42 Ibid., p. 9.
43 Ibid., p. 10.
44 Ibid., p. 11.
45 Ibid., p. 21.
46 Studies in Logical Theory, 1903, J. Dewey, Helen Thompson, Simon Fraser McLennan, Myron Lucius Ashley, Willard Clark Gore, William Arthur Heidel, Henry Walgrave Stuart, Addison Webster Moore.
47 Ibid., Preface, p. X.
48 The writers admit their indebtedness and sharp opposition to Mill, Lotze, Bradley, and Bosanquet. Ibid., Preface, p. XI.
49 A. W. Moore also continued to write in defense of Pragmatism.
50 I say “almost” because Dewey early in his career was an Hegelian in his philosophical affection.
51 The Postulate of Human Empiricism,“ Journal of Philosophy, Vol. II, 1905.
52 “The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism,” C. Bakewell, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. II, 1905, p. 687 ff.
53 “A Review of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IV, 1907; see also, “A Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalization,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IV, 1907, p. 421 ff.
54 Ibid., pp. 368, 369, 371, 424, 426.
55 A. O. Lovejoy, “The Thirteen Pragmatisms,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. V, 1908, p. 5ff.
56 J. E. Boodin, “What Pragmatism is and is not.” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VI, 1909.
57 Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VI, 1909.
58 Ibid., p. 460.
59 Ibid., p. 463.
60 Ibid., p. 490.
61 Ibid., p. 548.
62 Ibid., p. 567.
63 Ibid., p. 570.
64 Pragmatism and Its Critics, A. W. Moore, University of Chicago Press, 1910.
65 e.g. Royce, Bradley, Perry, Baldwin, Bakewell, Creighton, Fite.
66 Ibid., p. 87.
67 Ibid., p. 103.
68 D. C. MacIntosh, “Representational Pragmatism” Mind, N.S., Vol. XXI, 1912, p. 167.
69 Ibid., p. 177.
70 D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 410.
71 Creative Intelligence, Henry Holt, 1917, by Dewey, Moore, Brown, Mead, Bode, Stuart, Tufts, Italien.
72 Ibid., p. III.
73 Ibid., p. III.
74 “Pragmatism vs. Dualism,” Philosophical Review, Vol. XXVII, 1918.
75 Ibid., p. 33.
76 F. J. E. Woodbridge, '“The Promise of Pragmatism,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVI, 1929, p. 541.
77 B. H. Bode, “Realism and Objectivity,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IV, 1907.
78 W. P. Montague, “May a Realist be a Pragmatist?” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VI, 1907, p. 461.
79 Victor C. Harlow; Harlow Publishing Co., 1931.
80 W. P. Montague, Contemporary American Philosophy, 1930, Vol. II, p. 147.
81 “Realism as a Polemic and Program of Reform,” R. B. Perry, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VII, 1910.
82 Ibid., p. 348.
83 Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VII, 1910. The six were E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, E. G. Spaulding.
84 Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, 1911, p. 701.
85 Ibid., p. 701.
86 Ibid., p. 702.
87 Ibid., p. 703.
88 Ibid., p. 703.
89 Ibid., p. 703.
90 Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IX, 1912, p. 106.
91 A. O. Lovejoy, “Reflections of a Temporalist on the New Realism,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, 1911, p. 589.
92 Ibid., p. 590.
93 Ibid., p. 592.
94 Ibid., p. 592.
95 Ibid., p. 597.
96 The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy, Macmillan, 1912. E. B. Holt, W. T Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, E. G. Spaulding.
97 It was followed by other books developing in some detail the implications of neo-realism. e.g. Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, 1914, and The Freudian Wish, 1915; Marvin, A First Course in Metaphysics, 1912; and Spaulding, The New Rationalism, 1918; Perry's book, Present Philosophical Tendencies; also neo-realistic in point of view came earlier (1912).
98 G. E. Moore, B. Russell, A. N. Whitehead, S. Alexander, C. L. Morgan, J. Laird, P. Nunn, et. al.
99 A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, Rudolph Metz, Macmillan, 1938.
100 B. Russell, “The Basis of Realism,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, 1911, p. 153f.
101 Types of Philosophy, W. Hocking, Scribners 1939, p. VII.
102 “The Inadequacy of ‘Natural’ Realism,” D. Drake, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, 1911, p. 366.
103 Dr. D. C. Macintosh in 1913 worked out a position called epistemological monism and critical realism. The view was opposed to the epistemological monism and dogmatic realism of the neo-realists. “By this we mean to say that the object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at the moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived.” “Is Realistic Epistemological Monism Inadmissable?” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. X, 1913, p. 701. Also in this article consciousness is regarded as a productive activity. That is, it produces or creates the sense-qualities upon proper stimulation. Dr. Macintosh called this view, then “activistic realism.”
104 “Where do Perceived Objects Exist?” Mind, N. S. Vol. XXIV, 1915, p. 31.
105 Ibid., p. 31.
106 This point is stressed also by Sellars. See, “Epistemological Dualism versus Metaphysical Dualism,” Philosophical Review, Vol. XXX, 1921.
107 Philosophical Review, Vol. XXVI, 1917, p. 204.
108 “A Statement of Epistemological Dualism,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIII, 1916.
109 “A Defense of Dualistic Realism,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIV, 1917. “Realism and Perception,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XVI, 1919.
110 “Literal and Symbolic Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XV, 1918.
111 “The Case Against Dualism,” Philosophical Review, Vol. XXIX, 1920.
112 Ibid., p. 27.
113 Essays in Critical Realism, Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellars, Strong.
114 “Beyond the Essence,” G. Boas, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXII, 1925. “Essences and Universals,” D. W. Prall, Ibid.
“On Certain Difficulties in the Modern Doctrine of Essence,” M. W. Calkins, Ibid., Vol. XXIII, 1926.
“The Datum as Essence,” G. Boas, Ibid., Vol. XXIV, 1927.
“The Data of Consciousness as Essences,” D. Drake, Ibid.
“Mr. Drake on Essences and Data,” G. Boas, Ibid.
“Once More as to the Status of Data,” D. Drake, Ibid., Vol. XXV, 1928.
“Apropos of Essences,” C. M. Perry, Ibid., Vol. XXVI, 1929.
“The Vanishing Essence,” C. King, Ibid.
“Essences Sublimated,” C. Perry, Ibid., Vol. XXVII, 1930.
115 “What is the Correct Interpretation of Critical Realism,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, 1927, p. 238.
116 The Origin of Consciousness, p. 36.
117 “The Data of Consciousness as Essence,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, 1927, p. 520.
118 Mind and Its Place in Nature, D. Drake, Preface XIII.
