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Are There Necessary Connections in Nature?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Milton Fisk
Milton Fisk*
Affiliation:
Indiana Universty
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Abstract

The following questions are discussed here. Is induction a reasonable procedure in the context of a denial of physically necessary connections? What is physical necessity? If induction does presuppose physical necessity, what amount of it is presupposed ? It is argued that with logic as the only restriction on what is to count as a possible world, it is unreasonable to claim that observed connections, whether universal or statistical, will continue to hold. The concept of physical necessity is no more problematic than that of logical necessity, once it is recognized that the necessity of physical and logical necessity is the same. A variant of Keynes' principle of limited independent variety answers the question of the amount of physical necessity presupposed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 3 , September 1970 , pp. 385 - 404
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

*

I am endebted to my colleague Ronald Giere for having made many helpful criticisms of two previous versions of this paper.

References

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