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Confirmation and Hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Lawrence Resnick
Lawrence Resnick*
Affiliation:
Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania
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Abstract

This article consists in a critical examination of an argument which purports to prove that many scientific hypotheses held to be probable are actually certain. The argument rests on the assumption that since the nonphilosopher would say of many scientific hypotheses that they are certain and would deny that the best-established hypotheses are merely probable, philosophers who say that no scientific hypotheses are certain must be mistaken. Examination reveals that the argument fails to take account of the technical nature of the claim that even the best-established hypotheses are probable.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , January 1959 , pp. 25 - 30
Copyright
Copyright © 1959 by Philosophy of Science Association

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References

1 Philosophical Review, LXVII (1958), 95-100.

2 Introduction to Logic, (New York, 1953).

3 An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, (New York, 1934).

4 Among scientific hypotheses one may distinguish those which are specific and may be directly verified (e.g., “This litmus paper will turn red if it is dipped into that solution.”) and those which are abstract and only indirectly verifiable (e.g., “Atoms can be split.”) Nelson's remarks (and mine) concern the confirmation of the latter type only.

5 See also Cohen and Nagel, pp. 266, 279.