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Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

George A. Reisch
George A. Reisch*
Affiliation:
Committee on the Conceptual Foundations of Science, University of Chicago
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Abstract

In the light of two unpublished letters from Carnap to Kuhn, this essay examines the relationship between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Carnap's philosophical views. Contrary to the common wisdom that Kuhn's book refuted logical empiricism, it argues that Carnap's views of revolutionary scientific change are rather similar to those detailed by Kuhn. This serves both to explain Carnap's appreciation of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and to suggest that logical empiricism, insofar as that program rested on Carnap's shoulders, was not substantially upstaged by Kuhn's book.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 264 - 277
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper were given by Douglas Allchin, Jeff Ramsey, Robert Richards, Howard Stein, and an anonymous reviewer.

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