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Discussion: On Harold Jeffreys' Axioms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

S. Noorbaloochi*
Affiliation:
Statistics Department Ahwaz University Iran

Abstract

It is argued that models of H. Jeffreys' axioms of probability (Jeffreys [1939] 1967) are not monotone even with I. J. Good's proposed modification (Good 1950). Hence the additivity axiom seems essential to a theory of probability as it is with Kolmogorov's system (Kolmogorov 1950).

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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