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Four Types of Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Brian Cupples
Brian Cupples*
Affiliation:
University of New Brunswick
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Extract

In (Cupples 1977), it was argued that Professor David Kaplan's model of S-explanation could be formulated so as to provide a unified framework for three types of explanation, viz., potential, rationally acceptable, and true. In this note I correct an error in the statement of the conditions for a potential direct S-explanans, show that the corrected version leads to a further simplification in the conditions of the model, and propose a fourth type of explanation which the framework of S-explanation can accommodate.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , December 1980 , pp. 626 - 629
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am indebted to Professor Leon Ellsworth for his very helpful comments on an earlier essay, and to one of this journal's referees.

References

Carnap, R. (1962), “The Aim of Inductive Logic. ” In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Edited by P. Suppes, E. Nagel, and A. Tarski. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 303–318.Google Scholar
Cupples, B. (1977), “Three Types of Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 44, pp. 387–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hempel, C. (1962), “Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation.” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III. Edited by H. Feigl and G. Maxwell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 98–169.Google Scholar
Kyburg, H. (1971), Probability and Inductive Logic. London: The Macmillan Company.Google Scholar
Salmon, W. (1968), “Who Needs Inductive Acceptance Rules?” In The Problem of Inductive Logic. Edited by T. Lakatos. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., pp. 139–144.Google Scholar