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Is Essentialism Unscientific?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jarrett Leplin
Jarrett Leplin*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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Abstract

This paper defends the Causal Theory of Reference against the recent criticism that it imposes a priori constraints on the aims and practices of science. The metaphysical essentialism of this theory is shown to be compatible with the requirements of naturalistic epistemology. The theory is nevertheless unable to forestall the problem of incommensurability for scientific terms, because it misrepresents the conditions under which their reference is fixed. The resources of the Causal Theory of Reference and of the traditional cluster or “network” theory of meaning for handling problems of commensurability are compared, and an alternative approach is recommended.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 55 , Issue 4 , December 1988 , pp. 493 - 510
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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