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The Logical Character of the Principle of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Herbert Feigl
Herbert Feigl*
Affiliation:
The State University of Iowa
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Extract

The purpose of this paper is to make clear (1) that the widely recognized formulations of the principle of induction do not express the most fundamental rule of induction; (2) that the current view concerning the probability of induction must be revised in terms of a frequency theory of probability; (3) that on this basis the problem of induction in its traditional form is a pseudo-problem; and (4) that the principle of induction must be interpreted as a pragmatic or operational maxim.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , January 1934 , pp. 20 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1934

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References

1 This paper was read at a meeting of the western division of the American Philosophical Association at Ann Arbor, March, 1932. In what is presented as the constructive part, I am indebted to the criticisms and suggestions of Professor P. W. Bridgman and Professor C. I. Lewis of Harvard University, as well as to my friends of the Vienna circle, especially Professor R. Carnap and Professor M. Schlick.

2 E. Zilsel : Das Anwendungsproblem, Leipzig, 1916. C. D. Broad : “The Principles of Problematic Induction,” Proc. Aristot. Soc., 1917–8. J. M. Keynes : A Treatise on Probability, 1921. Nicod: Foundations of Geometry and Induction, 1930.

3 H. Reichenbach : Axiome d. Wahrsch. Math. Zs. 1932.

4 It should be noted that the frequency theory is still in process of completion and reconciliation with the logical theory. There are difficulties, but they do not appear insurmountable.

5 “Hume Without Scepticism,” Mind, 1930.