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On the Metaphysics of Species*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Judith K. Crane
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Abstract

This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional “species problem,” in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals. I develop the idea that species names are rigid designators and show how this provides additional motivation for SAI.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 156 - 173
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

For helpful comments and discussions, I thank Berit Brogaard, John Danley, Graeme Forbes, Chris Horvath, Skip Larkin, Tom Paxson, Jim Stone, Jim Van Cleve, Bob Wolf, Gideon Yaffe, Dean Zimmerman, and two anonymous referees for Philosophy of Science.

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