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Reduction, Elimination, and the Mental

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University
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Abstract

The antireductionist arguments of many philosophers (e.g., Baker, Fodor and Davidson) are motivated by a worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental. This worry derives from a misunderstanding of the empiricist account of reduction, which, although it does not underwrite “cognitive suicide”, should be rejected for its positivist baggage. Philosophy of psychology needs more detailed attention to issues in natural science which serve as analogies for reduction of the mental. I consider a range of central cases, including water and H2O, genes and DNA, and common sense and scientific solidity. The last case is illuminated by Eddington's Two Tables paradox, a resolution which suggests the plasticity of the mental under reduction. If reduction of the mental is like any of these cases, it is neither empiricist nor eliminative.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 203 - 220
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Jaegwon Kim started me on this project by arguing forcefully that reduction is eliminative. Robert Van Gulik commented helpfully on an earlier draft of the paper at the 1989 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division. I am indebted for incisive comments to two anonymous referees for Philosophy of Science, to Alan Gibbard, David Hills, Stewart Shapiro, and especially to Peter Railton. This paper would be rather more unsatisfactory than it is without the patient assistance of a number of scientists: Daniel Axelrod (physics), Miriam Greenberg (biology), John Loeser (chemistry), and Benjamin Schwartz (mathematics). It goes without saying they are not responsible for errors that remain, but I will say it anyway.

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