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The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Richard Rudner*
Affiliation:
The Tufts College Systems Coordination Project, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D. C.

Extract

The question of the relationship of the making of value judgments in a typically ethical sense to the methods and procedures of science has been discussed in the literature at least to that point which e. e. cummings somewhere refers to as “The Mystical Moment of Dullness.” Nevertheless, albeit with some trepidation, I feel that something more may fruitfully be said on the subject.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1953

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Footnotes

The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the Naval Establishments at large.

References

(1) Carnap, R., “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, XI, 1950, p. 20–40.Google Scholar
(2) Neyman, J., First Course in Probability and Statistics, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950.Google Scholar
(3) Quine, W. V., “On Carnap's Views on Ontology,” Philosophical Studies, II. No. 5, 1951.Google Scholar
(4) Rosander, A. C., Elementary Principles of Statistics. New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1951.Google Scholar