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Selection and Causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Mohan Matthen  and
André Ariew
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Abstract

We have argued elsewhere that natural selection is not a cause of evolution, and that a resolution-of-forces (or vector addition) model does not provide us with a proper understanding of how natural selection combines with other evolutionary influences. These propositions have come in for criticism recently, and here we clarify and defend them. We do so within the broad framework of our own ‘hierarchical realization model’ of how evolutionary influences combine.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 76 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 201 - 224
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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