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Semantic Paradoxes and the Propositional Analysis of Indirect Discourse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Nicholas Rescher
Nicholas Rescher*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Extract

The object of the present discussion is to show that the analysis of indirect discourse obtained when the concept of assertion is construed as a relationship that obtains between the asserting person and the asserted proposition—along the familiar lines proposed by Church [3, 4]—is entirely adequate of itself to circumvent the semantical paradoxes in which indirect discourse is involved.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , October 1961 , pp. 437 - 440
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1961

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References

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