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Statistics, Pragmatics, Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

C. West Churchman
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Abstract

1. Deductive and Inductive Inference. Within the traditional treatments of scientific method, e.g., in (2) and (25), it was customary to divide scientific inference into two parts: deductive and inductive. Deductive inference was taken to mean the activity of deducing theorems from postulates and definitions, whereas inductive inference represented the activity of constructing a general statement from a set of particular “facts.” Deductive inference was relegated to the mathematical (formal) sciences, and inductive inference to the empirical (non-formal) sciences. As a consequence, the whole of science was split into two quite distinct parts: deductive science was conceived to start with precise axioms, postulates, and definitions, and its method consisted in drawing inferences from these “givens” in such a way that if the original assumptions are taken as true, then the theorems must be taken as true also. The obligation behind this “must” of the mathematical sciences was an obligation based on strict rules of deductive inference; in the earlier analyses, it was supposed that these rules were all aspects of the general theory of the syllogism, as it was described in an almost complete form in (2) but in later work the rules have been formalized in more general terms (17). Inductive inference, on the other hand, was supposed to start with observed facts; these facts, or “data,” were presumably given by the senses, and described particular aspects of the external world. If the facts were given in a certain way, then the empirical scientist could “infer” a generalized description; this generalization had the characteristic that if it were granted as true, then all the facts could be deduced as consequences. The inductive process admittedly does not lead to unique generalizations (no more than the deductive process leads to unique theorems), and the philosopher of science searched for other defining characteristics of good inference, such as “simplicity” and “convenience.” These empirical generalizations were taken to be “descriptions of the phenomenal world of the scientist”; a further inductive step might be taken by constructing a set of very general principles out of the more specialized generalizations within specific research problems. These “higher” inductive inferences were regarded as “theories,” which could be studied by themselves within the method of deductive inference. The scientist was then described as “checking” theory by determining whether or not the predicted consequences deduced from theory actually hold in the phenomenal world.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , July 1948 , pp. 249 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1948

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Footnotes

1

This paper is based in part on material contained in (11) and (13).

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