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The Universe Had One Chance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Heather Demarest
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Abstract

In a deterministically evolving world, the usefulness of nontrivial probabilities can seem mysterious. I use the ‘Mentaculus’ machinery developed by David Albert and Barry Loewer to show how all probabilities in such a world can be derived from a single, initial chance event. I go on to argue that this is the only genuine chance event. Perhaps surprisingly, we have good evidence of its existence and nature. I argue that the existence of this chance event justifies our epistemic reliance on nontrivial probabilities.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 83 , Issue 2 , April 2016 , pp. 248 - 264
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Zachary Miller, David Albert, Jenann Ismael, Barry Loewer, and Jonathan Schaffer for extremely helpful discussions and extensive feedback on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank the colloquia audiences at Purdue University, the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Georgia and the audience at the Necessity Conference at the University of Nebraska. Additional thanks to Thomas Blanchard, Martin Curd, Alison Fernandez, Branden Fitelson, James Hawthorne, Michael Hicks, and Jennifer Wang for insightful comments and discussions.

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