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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
Philosophers have taken some salutary exercise in recent years—notably in this journal—on the question of the rights of non-human animals and the obligations of human to non-human individuals and species. In so contentious an area there has been striking unanimity on two aspects. One of these is that, irrespective of the merits of the arguments on specific issues, this is a matter which is bound to affect the conduct of our lives. The other is that, other things being equal, it is prima facie wrong to be cruel to animals.
1 See in particular Philosophy 53, No. 206 (October 1978).
2 As a zoologist I have performed physiological and behavioural experiments on animals of all vertebrate classes within two medical schools, where such work is taken for granted as a basis for teaching and research, and, of more immediate relevance, in a school of agriculture, where it is seen as an integral part of the science of ‘animal husbandry and production’.
3 See Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976)Google Scholar and ‘All Animals are Equal’ in Regan, T. and Singer, P. (eds), Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice Hall, 1976)Google Scholar.
4 I am aware that on this definition it can plausibly be maintained that all living organisms have interests.
5 Albert Schweitzer. ‘The Ethics of Reverence for Life’; reprinted in Regan and Singer, op. cit., 134.
6 One who practises speciesism (see Ryder, Richard, ‘Life in the Laboratory’ in Godlovitch, S. and R. and Harris, J. (eds), Animals, Men and Morals (London: Gollancz, 1971), a form of prejudice with respect to other species which is essentially analogous to the prejudice people may have with respect to other races or the opposite sexGoogle Scholar.
7 From Modes of Thought, 1938; quoted by Thorpe, W. H., Animal Nature and Human Nature (London: Methuen, 1974), 211Google Scholar.
8 Thorpe, op. cit., 301.
9 Benson, John, ‘Duty and the Beast’, Philosophy 53, No. 206 (10 1978), 547CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 Francis, Leslie Pickering and Norman, Richard, ‘Some Animals are More Equal than Others’, Philosophy 53, No. 206 (10 1978), 507–527CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 Diamond, Cora, ‘Eating Meat and Eating People’, Philosophy 53, No, 206 (10 1978), 470CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Charles Darwin, ‘Outline of the Evidence’ in The Descent of Man; reprinted in The Darwin Reader, M. Bates and P. S. Humphrey (eds) (London: Macmillan, 1957), 294.
13 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘A Critique of Kant’; reprinted in Regan and Singer, op. cit., 125.
14 Biologists may, of course, soon be able to put together the vehicle that carries life.
15 Sherrington, Charles, Man on His Nature (London: Pelican reprint, 1955), 286Google Scholar.
16 Donald Vandeveer, ‘Defending Animals by Appeal to Rights’, in Regan and Singer, op. cit., 227.
17 Francis and Norman, op. cit., 527.
18 See in particular Regan, Tom, ‘The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5, No. 2 (10 1975), 205–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
19 The neurophysiological evidence indicates that the sensation of pain is mediated by a distinct type of nerve fibre; i.e. pain does not seem to result from the over-stimulation of fibres that normally transmit other sorts of sensation, such as touch or temperature. This, however, in no way undermines the general validity and relevance of Aristotle's interpretation.
20 Sherrington, op. cit., 286.
21 Sherrington, op. cit., 291.
22 Singer, Isaac Bashevis, Enemies, A Love Story (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1971), 256–257. (First quoted in this context by Tom Regan, op. cit., 181.)Google Scholar
23 Orwell, George, Animal Farm (London: Penguin reprint, 1963), 114Google Scholar.
24 Forster, E. M., Howards End (London: Edward Arnold, 1910), title pageGoogle Scholar.
25 But whether society has the right to ask of an individual that he gain his livelihood working, for example, in a slaughterhouse, is another matter.
26 Benson, op. cit., 545.
27 I am grateful to Chris Cherry and Richard Norman for their generous advice and comments.
