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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
If we ask what are the problems which have to be dealt with when the subject of art is being discussed in a philosophical manner, we shall no doubt receive a variety of answers: but there will be in one respect a considerable measure of agreement, viz. that the main problem consists in discovering (a) what is the common property in all works of art which distinguishes them from things that are not works of art, and (b) what is the common property in all good works of art which distinguishes them from bad or mediocre ones. Certainly an immense amount of labour has in the past been devoted to this purpose. Recent philosophical practice, however, has implied some dissatisfaction with this type of approach, and the purpose of this article is to try to show that the dissatisfaction is justified.
page 150 note 1 Even this, as it stands, is usually an uninteresting question for the art–historian, who is more likely to learn something valuable from an investigation into specific periods or types of musical composition than from a general inquiry covering the whole field.
page 152 note 1 I say “roughly” deliberately; the conventional belief in a rigid and exhaustive distinction between description, or interpretation, and evaluation is, in my view, mistaken.
page 152 note 2 If we look at the wide variety of aesthetically commendatory words in common use we shall see that the philosopher's concentration on “beautiful” to the neglect of the rest is greatly fostered, even if not wholly caused, by this fondness for pigeon–holing.
