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An Aspect Of Sartre And The Unconscious
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
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ALTHOUGH Sartre peremptorily rejects the Freudian concept of the unconscious as a ‘mere postulate’ which is refuted by the (for him) obvious truth that the ‘psychic factor is co-extensive with consciousness,’ the frequency with which Freud's name recurs in L'Être et le Néant and the important role assigned to ‘existential psychoanalysis’ inevitably suggest that the impact of Freud's doctrines on Sartre may be much greater than he admits or is even aware. The purpose of this paper, however, is not to review the general question of the relations of Sartre and Freud or to undertake a detailed examination of the more specific problem created by Sartre's rejection of the unconscious, but rather to discuss this latter point mainly in its bearing upon limited aspects of Sartre's treatment of ‘being-for-others.’ I hope, however, that this more precise enquiry will lead to certain general conclusions concerning the validity of the two attitudes considered, not simply as attempts to illustrate a priori principles, but as efforts to throw light on definite though complex psychological phenomena. In this way the merits of each viewpoint will be tested by its capacity to clarify concrete problems.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1955
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page 33 note 1 This does not mean that Sartre has a detailed knowledge of Freud's work. Already more than one critic has called attention to the insufficiency of Sartre's reading in psycho-analysis. J. Boutonnier, for example, in L’Angoisse (Paris, 1945), p. 125 et passim, suggests that Sartre has not read much more than Freud's Introductory Lectures and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life ‘with an occasional glance at Adler's work.’ Since, however, Sartre's rejection of the unconscious has far-reaching effects upon his own system, his explanation of the facts discussed by Freud and others must be considered with some care.
page 33 note 2 The question has already been treated in certain of its aspects and mainly from a neo-Thomist viewpoint by Dr. P. J. R. Dempsey in The Psychology of Sartre (Cork University Press, 1950).
page 33 note 3 J Cf. L'Être et le Néant, Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique (Paris, 1944), esp. Part III, Chapter 3, pp. 428 ff.
page 34 note 1 Freud at first seems to have treated masochism as a secondary reaction produced by the frustration of more basic impulses but in his later work he made it a primary phenomenon, deriving it from the working of the ‘death instinct.’ More recent discussions of this difficult psychological topic are to be found in Karen Homey's New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), esp. Chapter XV, ‘Masochistic Phenomena,’ and in Wilhelm Reich's Character Analysis (translated by T. P. Wolfe, Vision Press, 1950). A more strictly Freudian account is given in Dr. Edward Glover's Psycho-analysis (2nd ed., 1947).
page 36 note 1 I am not suggesting that psycho-analytic criticism of Sartre may not be valuable in its due time and place, but plainly we cannot begin with it. The psycho-analysis of Sartre the man can have at most an explanatory function and suggest a few reasons why he has chosen to limit himself to certain attitudes. Such considerations must follow not precede a discussion of the impersonal issues raised by his viewpoint. The general questions must be treated on their own merits.
page 37 note 1 For the purposes of this paper ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ are defined in terms of adaptation to function.