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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
I propose to elaborate some hints dropped by Mr. Strawson2 in order to relieve those pressures of language that have led philosophers to pose and attempt to answer the pseudo-question, “How is induction justified?” Once the source of these pressures is exposed we can turn our attention to the real problems of induction, namely how particular inductive procedures are justified, without feeling that a deeper problem remains always to be solved.
page 58 note 2 P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, Chapter IX, Part 2.
page 59 note 1 R. Carnap, The Logical Foundations of Probability, Chapter I.
page 59 note 2 R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, Chapter I.
page 60 note 1 Journal of the Chemical Society, 1955, p. 1778.
page 61 note 1 Journal of the Chemical Society, p. 1901.
page 61 note 2 Ibid., p. 1902.
page 61 note 3 Proceedings of the Physical Society, September 1955, p. 795.
page 61 note 4 Ibid., p. 833.
page 61 note 5 loc. cit.
page 61 note 6 Ibid., p. 835.
page 61 note 7 This is very clearly discussed by Professor G. Ryle, “If, so, because” in Philosophic Analysis, ed. M. Black, p. 323.
page 64 note 1 P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, especially Part I.
