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Moral Conflicts and Moral Awareness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2011

Chris Bessemans
Chris Bessemans*
Affiliation:
Higher Institute of Philosophy, K.U. Leuven PhD Fellowship Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO)
*
chris.bessemans@hiw.kuleuven.be
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Abstract

By making use of Aurel Kolnai's ethical writings I want to offer a more adequate understanding of moral conflicts and moral dilemmas. Insisting on Kolnai's phenomenological method, in particular, focussing on the agent's moral awareness (or conscience) and his deliberation, results in an understanding of moral conflicts as moments of moral choice rather than anomalies of moral theory. In this way, I argue that one can account for Bernard Williams's phenomenological description of moral conflicts without having to accept his anti-realist conclusions. Moreover, this approach indicates the adequacy of ordinary moral reasoning for decision-making and action guidance. Lastly and importantly, the essay illustrates the relevance of Kolnai's writings to contemporary moral philosophy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 86 , Issue 4 , October 2011 , pp. 563 - 587
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2011

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