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The Paragon of Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Karl Britton
Affiliation:
King's CollegeNewcastle upon Tyne.

Extract

I. “Our reason must be consider'd as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect.”1 In these quaint words, David Hume expresses the Philosophers’ point of view. By means of reason we must be able to see the truth of principles and to see that truth without any possibility of error. This view has been so long and so firmly held that it may be called the philosophical ideal of knowledge. Reason is not truly reason, unless by it we can come to know truths that are absolutely certain; truths of principle that are absolutely universal. It has always been admitted that much that is called “knowledge” in ordinary conversation, much that passes for knowledge in the schools, is neither absolutely certain nor absolutely universal. But it has been held that knowledge has been achieved or might be achieved in certain sciences: in ethics (according to some), or in metaphysics, or in physics or in mathematics.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1954

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References

page 216 note 1 Treatise on Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section 1.

page 217 note 1 Some Problems of Philosophy, 1911, p. 100.

page 217 note 1 Essay on the Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter IV (6).

page 222 note 1 Treatise, Book I, Part III, Section 1.

page 223 note 1 Treatise, Book I, Part III, Section 14.

page 227 note 1 System of Logic, Book II, Chapter VI (2).

page 230 note 1 Essay, Book I, Chapter I (5).