Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-t6hkb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-12T06:18:28.159Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Revisiting a Signaling Game of Legislative–Judiciary Interaction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Hong Min Park
Hong Min Park*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, P.O. Box 413, Bolton 680, Milwaukee, WI 53211 e-mail: hmpark1@uwm.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

By adding an informational component to the judicial review, Rogers (2001) argued that an independent court can be created and maintained by a legislature. This influential article, however, has one important mistake in its game-theoretical model that changes the equilibrium results and ultimately undermines the theoretical contribution to the discipline. The legislature no longer enjoys informational benefits by having an independent court.

Type
Letter
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , Autumn 2016 , pp. 501 - 504
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Rogers, James R. 2001. Information and judicial review: A signaling game of legislative–judicial interaction. American Journal of Political Science 45(1):84–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Park Supplementary Material

Appendix

Download Park Supplementary Material(PDF)
PDF 272.8 KB
Supplementary material: File

Park Supplementary Material

Appendix

Download Park Supplementary Material(File)
File 18.6 KB