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Greater public confidence in the US Supreme Court predicts more jurisdiction stripping

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 April 2021

Joseph Daniel Ura*
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University, 2935 Research Parkway, 311 Liberal Arts & Social Science Building, College Station, TX 77843 Texas A&M University at Qatar, Texas A&M Engineering Building, PO Box 23874, Education City, Doha, Qatar
Patrick C. Wohlfarth
Affiliation:
University of Maryland, 3140 Tydings Hall, 7343 Preinkert Drive, College Park, MD 20742, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: jura@tamu.edu

Abstract

A growing body of empirical research shows an association between public support for the US Supreme Court and both judicial independence and congressional court curbing activity. At the same time, studies of jurisdiction stripping show Congress’ efforts to limit federal courts’ jurisdiction are principally related to courts’ workloads rather than ideological differences between courts and Congress. Here, the authors connect these streams of inquiry by testing the hypothesis of a negative relationship between public support for the Supreme Court and jurisdiction-stripping legislation. Contrary to prior studies, the authors find a positive relationship between Americans’ confidence in the Supreme Court and jurisdiction stripping. This result indicates the need for additional research on the interactions among public opinion, federal courts, and Congress.

Type
Research Note
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the European Political Science Association

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