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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 October 2015
The time is July 1988, and baseball fever is rising. With barely a glimmer of hope remaining, “Big Jim” Thompson steps into the batter's box to swat a ninth inning “home run” that prevents the White Sox from going down to defeat—or more accurately—from going down to Florida. Such is the stuff of legends, although the real story is hardly less dramatic. Seated at a desk at home plate of Comiskey Park, Illinois Governor James Thompson signed a $ 150 million financing package for the construction of a new stadium that will keep the White Sox in Chicago and fore-close the team's removal to St. Petersburg. With vigorous lobbying from the Governor, the Illinois General Assembly, in the closing minutes of its 1988 session, had narrowly approved the stadium legislation.
The news from Chicago, however, is more than a baseball story. The news tells us a great deal about modern governors in domestic policy making. They are more activist than their counterparts a generation or so ago, particularly in the realm of homestate economic development. Though most governors do not serve as long as Thompson–by late 1988, he had been governor for nearly 12 years–modern governors, as compared to their 1950s counterparts, are staying in office longer and, perhaps as a consequence, acquiring greater national influence.
1. See “White Sox Stay Put on 11th-Hour Vote,” Washington Post, July 2, 1988, p. D5Google Scholar; Kass, John, “Sawyer Reassures Stadium Foes,” Chicago Tribune, July 7, 1988, sec. I, p. 9Google Scholar.
2. Since the mid-1950s, the number of states electing governors to two-year terms has fallen from 19 to 3; the number of states limiting the governor to a single four-year term or prohibiting immediate succession dropped from 17 to 3. Beyle, Thad L., “The Governors, 1986-87,” in The Book of the States, 1988-89 Edition (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1988), p. 30Google Scholar. The enlarged tenure potential of governors has enabled governors to stay in office longer. More than 70 percent of governors elected during the 1950s served four years or less; in contrast, half of the governors elected in the 1970s served five years or more. Sabato, Larry, Goodbye to Good-time Charlie: The American Governorship Transformed, 2nd Ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1983), p. 104Google Scholar.
3. Aside from the media attention that tends to follow governors who become presidential candidates, the media appear to be devoting more attention to state politics in general. This reflects several forces. One is journalistic recognition of the increasing significance of state governments; USA Today's page of state news is but one obvious indicator of this recognition. A second is the dramatic expansion of public affairs programming on television, with the advent of Cable News Network and C-SPAN; with more time to fill, television news is giving the states more time; of course, the technical capacity to pick up news stories from around the country has improved substantially in recent years. The attention given to state governments is not always flattering, as the 1980s brought a startling rash of impeachment proceedings and public trials involving governors. The most celebrated case, of course, was that of Arizona Governor Evan Mecham, who was impeached, convicted and removed from office in 1988.
4. “The Statehouses: Action and Innovation,” Newsweek 110 (March 24, 1986), p. 30Google Scholar.
5. Sabato, , Goodbye to Good-time Charlie, p. 201Google Scholar.
6. The data on governmental spending, reported in this and subsequent paragraphs, are taken from, or calculated from data in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism 1988 Edition, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1987), pp. 2-5, 12-13, 15Google Scholar.
7. See Moore, W. John, “Red Ink, Red Faces,” National Journal 20 (July 9, 1988), 1799–1802Google Scholar.
8. See Biermann, Melanie J., “Virginia in the Global Marketplace: Public Policy for the 21st Century,” University of Virginia News Letter 63 (August 1987), pp. 67–72Google Scholar.
9. Federal domestic spending is defined here as total federal spending minus defense spending and interest payments. See ACIR, Significant Features 1988, pp. 12–13Google Scholar.
10. On the governors' role in welfare reform, see, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Views of the National Governors' Association on Major Legislative Proposals, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial 100-4 (1987); Knudsen, Patrick, “After Long, Bruising Battle, House Approves Welfare Bill,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 45 (December 19, 1987), 3157–65Google Scholar; and Rovner, Julie, “Deep Schisms Still Imperil Welfare Overhaul,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 46 (June 18, 1988), 1647–1650Google Scholar.
11. Kincaid, John, “The American Governors in International Affairs,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 14 (Fall 1984), at 107Google Scholar.
12. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation, Work, Education, and Training Opportunities for Welfare Recipients, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Serial 99–91 (1986), p. 13 (Testimony of Alicia Smith, Staff Director, Committee on Human Resources, NGA).
