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The acceptance of low prestige
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 May 2016
Abstract
I employ a simulation model previously used to analyze the choice of top members in a hierarchy to examine the acceptance of low prestige in a group of possibly large size. Results show that acceptance of low rank is most likely when the collective benefit available is mostly nonrival and nonexcludable and has low additivity (every contribution helps), and the ability of even low ability group members to contribute is high in absolute terms. I discuss possible mechanisms, through genetic or behavioral selection, by which the capacity to believe in one's own low rank may have developed.
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