1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Northeast Political Science Association, New Haven, Conn. (November 1982). Partial support for the preparation of this article was provided by a grant to Peter Corning from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, whose assistance is hereby gratefully acknowledged. Comments offered by Benson Ginsburg in the panel discussion are also appreciated, as are the comments on closely related papers byAlker, Hayward, Carneiro, Robert, Davies, James, Deutsch, Karl, Schubert, Glendon, White, Elliott, Wiegele, Thomas, and Willhoite, Fred.Google Scholar

2. One exception is the work ofColeman, (1971), who was inspired by Talcott Parsons' revival (masked by new terminology) of Herbert Spencer's nineteenth century orthogenesis, which differs markedly from a truly Darwinian framework (see below). Coleman further confuses the issue by treating historical and evolutionary approaches as different from one another, and by assigning to the “development syndrome” phenomena that are here treated as contingent aspects of political evolution, as opposed to development.Google Scholar

3. Eckstein, (1982) also called for the use of a longer time frame, as didLasswell, (1968) andRiggs, (1981). From the perspective to be adumbrated here, however, their depth of field was still quite shallow and their orientation was not truly evolutionary.Google Scholar

4. Blute, (1979) showed that a truly evolutionary perspective was then still lacking in the social sciences. Rather, the social sciences were committed to what Blute called “the natural law approach of sociocultural evolutionism.” The descent with modification approach of biocultural evolution which we are advocating, avoids the criticisms of earlier developmentalist approaches and satisfies the need for a more historical approach that is at the same time capable of leading to theory.Google Scholar

5. Spencer has become a virtual nonperson among twentieth century social scientists, and some of his cardinal contributions to social science theory are often attributed to others, most notably Emile Durkheim. Yet, Spencer was the premier social evolutionist of his age and one of the leading intellects of the nineteenth century. For a detailed discussion of Spencer's contributions, seeCorning, (1982).Google Scholar

6. It should be noted that Huntington has employed the term in several different senses. Sometimes he uses it as we do here to mean a decline in functional efficiency. At other times, though, he uses it as an antonym for development qua increased institutional complexity. In this sense, decay means structural simplification. In actual usage throughout Huntington's writings, however, one also finds the term used in relation to such things as emergency rule by decree, banning of opposition parties, and military coups—i.e., a decline specifically in participatory, democratic institutions.Google Scholar

7. For the application of the concept of architectonics to the study of political development, seeBraibanti, (1968).Google Scholar

8. Some anthropologists prefer to use the term “devolution.” However, we use the term favored by evolutionary biologists. Devolution implies a reversal or unwinding of some inherent evolutionary direction or course and is therefore misleading. Regression, on the other hand, refers to a change in any specified contingent trend. That too is a form of evolution.Google Scholar

9. Many theorists seem to assume that increased structural complexity necessarily translates into greater functional capabilities or efficiency, but this is not by any means a certainty. In many cases, “complexification” may amount to nothing more than running to stay in place. An elected legislature may do no more than provide an imperfect functional equivalent for the face-to-face communications that regulate tribal societies.Google Scholar

10. It should be noted that there is much more of an affinity between economics and theoretical ecology (or what has been called “bioeconomics”) than is often assumed to be the case. For one thing, both “economics” and “ecology” are etymologically linked to the Greek word for “household”, oikos. Indeed, some of the more popular definitions of economics (there is no one, universally accepted definition) could well serve for both economics and ecology: (1) management of the household, and (2) allocation of scarce resources to achieve various objectives or ends. There is, of course, a school of thought, both in biology and economics, that emphasizes competition, or the division of labor, or both, as the defining subject matter of the two disciplines (Ghiselin, , 1974, 1978; Hirschleifer, , 1978). However, the broader definition has the advantages of being focused more pointedly on the underlying problem of “earning a living” and less on how it is accomplished. In either event, some of the same phenomena are common to both disciplines (e.g., competition, cooperation, specialization, the division of labor). Furthermore, many of the quantitative techniques for analyzing individual behavior prove to be equally serviceable in either discipline. Because economists and bioeconomists are both concerned with ends-related individual choices, decisions and actions, both have made extensive use of benefit-cost analyses, optimization models, strategic choice models and game theoretic models (see especiallyWilson, , 1975; Krebs, and Davies, , 1978). Of course, there are also some important distinctions between ecology and economics. Perhaps the most important one has to do with the fact that ecology is focused on adaptive (Darwinian) values—on needs that are related to biological survival and reproduction through time. By contrast, the science of economics has traditionally been value-related; it has deliberately avoided approaches to the analysis of human behavior that involve the use of some external value criterion beyond the individual's tastes.Google Scholar

11. Though some students of international relations have been using the term “ecology” to characterize an orientation that consciously encompasses the physical and biotic milieu of human societies, our usage is much broader. The closest approximation to our usage isRussett's, (1967). However, his formulation is still more limited than ours. He uses the term with reference to the relationship between a political system and the “social and physical environment.” Another step is required to reach a multilevelled cybernetic systems-within-ecosystems paradigm (seeOrr, , 1979).Google Scholar

12. “There is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune: Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in miseries” (Julius Caesar, Act IV, Scene iii). See alsoSchlesinger, (1939) andDeutsch, (1979).Google Scholar

13. For a more recent assessment of participation and democracy in relation to theories of modernization/development seeHuntington, and Nelson, (1976). For a view of the disagreement over the causal relationship between modernization/development and democratic government seePowell, (1982). For an earlier expression of doubt on this relationship and the possibility of corporatism seeRogowski, and Wasserspring, (1971).Google Scholar

14. Lerner's propositions grew out of a larger framework in which “modernity” was (correctly) viewed as a systemic phenomenon that was characterized by a high degree of co-variation among the various dimensions or sectors of a society. Lerner's book was a seminal work among functionalist-oriented developmental theorists.Google Scholar

15. The role of communication processes as a variable was discussed in detail by Lerner in his 1958 volume and byDeutsch, (1953). It was further developed subsequently by, among others, Pye, (1963), Almond, and Verba, (1963), Fagen, (1966), McCrone, and Cnudde, (1967), Brunner, and Brewer, (1971), andDahl, (1971).Google Scholar

16. Supporting evidence can also be found in the writings of the so-called “neo-corporalist” theorists, who view the state as potentially a partially autonomous actor in shaping the process of economic development, both internally and in the international arena. See especiallyPike, and Stritch, (1974), Chirot, (1975, 1980), Hammergren, (1977), Malloy, (1977), Wiarda, (1977), Collier, and Collier, (1979), Berger, (1981), andNordinger, (1981).Google Scholar