Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-jwnkl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-11T02:27:50.007Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Public goods and the evolution of altruism: The case of law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Paul H. Rubin
Paul H. Rubin*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and School of Law, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322, USA prubin@emory.edu
Get access

Abstract

Though Hamilton's rule is commonly interpreted as relating to two individuals, an alternative interpretation is that it can apply to an altruistic act with respect to a large group of related persons, such as an ethnic group. Then provision of a public good to such a group can be explained by Hamilton's rule. An important class of public goods is the provision of a “legal system” for the group. Provision of this good can have positive feedback effects: as there is more enforcement, it pays to define more complex and valuable rights, and in turn such rights lead to larger and more effective societies. As societies become larger, the ability to enforce rights increases because the number of enforcers increases. However, as in many other human activities, there may be two conflicting systems for provision of this good. There is the evolutionarily old system that would involve face to face transactions, often with kin. There is also a newer, rule-governed legal system for impersonal exchanges. These may be in conflict. The older rules may sometimes frustrate the more efficient newer system. Moreover, those persons who benefit from kin-based transaction networks may resist the creation of a formal legal system. I also note that altruism within the group may lead to xenophobia outside the group and thus to ethnic conflict. Finally, I discuss some evidence consistent with this analysis.

Type
Research Article
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , September 2007 , pp. 26 - 32
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1.Rubin, Paul H., Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origin of Freedom (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002).Google Scholar
2.Keeley, Lawrence H., War before Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).Google Scholar
3.Whitmeyer, Joseph M., “Endogamy as a basis for ethnic behavior,” Sociological Theory 1997, 15(2):162–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4.Hamilton, W. D., “The genetical evolution of social behaviour I and II,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 1964, 7: 1–16, 17–52Google Scholar
5.Goetze, David, “Public goods, sharing genes, and the formation of large groups,” Politics and the Life Sciences (in press).Google Scholar
6.Rubin, Darwinian Politics.Google Scholar
7.Hayek, F. A., The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 11Google Scholar
8.Jones, Owen D, “Time-shifted rationality and the law of law's leverage: Behavioral economics meets behavioral biology,” Northwestern University Law Review 2001, 95:1141–1205.Google Scholar
9.Rubin, Darwinian Politics.Google Scholar
10.Rubin, Paul H., “Folk economics,” Southern Economic Journal 2003, 70(1):157–171.Google Scholar
11.Whitmeyer, “Endogamy as a basis for ethnic behavior.”Google Scholar
12.Ibid., p. 169Google Scholar
13.Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven, Fairness versus Welfare (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), xxii + 544pages.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
14.Bailey, Martin, “Approximate optimality of aboriginal property rights,” Journal of Law and Economics April 1992, 35:183–198.Google Scholar
15.Trivers, Robert L., “The evolution of reciprocal altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology 1971, 46:35–57.Google Scholar
16.Gintis, Herbert, Bowles, Sam, Boyd, Robert, and Fehr, Ernst, “Explaining altruistic behavior in humans,” Evolution and Human Behavior 2003, 24:153–172.Google Scholar
17.Bingham, Paul M., “Human uniqueness: A general theory,” The Quarterly Review of Biology June 1999, 74(2):133–169.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
18.Tooby, John, Cosmides, Leda, and Price, Michael E., “Cognitive adaptations for n-person exchange: The evolutionary roots of organizational behavior,” Managerial and Decision Economics 2006, 27:103–129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
19.Frank, R. H., Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: Norton, 1988).Google Scholar
20.Rubin, Paul, Tort Reform by Contract (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1993).Google Scholar
21.Sunstein, Cass R., Hastie, Reid, Payne, John W., Schkade, David A., and Viscusi, W. Kip, Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2003).Google Scholar
22.Bandes, Susan, The Passions of Law (New York: New York University Press, 2001).Google Scholar
23.Landa, Janet, “A theory of the ethnically homogeneous middleman group: An institutional alternative to contract law,” Journal of Legal Studies 1981, 10:349–362.Google Scholar
24.Rubin, Darwinian Politics.Google Scholar
25.Rubin, “Folk economics.”Google Scholar
26.Alesina, Alberto and Ferrara, Eliana La, “Ethnic diversity and economic performance,” Journal of Economic Literature 2005, 43(3):762–800.Google Scholar
27.Ibid., p. 764Google Scholar
28.Ibid., pp. 764–765.Google Scholar
29.Rushton, J. Philippe, “Ethnic nationalism, evolutionary psychology and Genetic Similarity Theory,” Nations and Nationalism 2005, 11(4):489–507.Google Scholar
30.Shaw, R. Paul and Wong, Yuwa, Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).Google Scholar
31.Van den Berghe, Pierre, The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York: Elsevier, 1981).Google Scholar
32.Alesina, and Ferrara, La, “Ethnic diversity and economic performance,” p. 765.Google Scholar
33.Ibid., p. 783Google Scholar
34.Guiso, Luigi, Sapienza, Paola, and Zingales, Luigi, “Cultural biases in economic exchange,” December 2004, NBER Working Paper No. W11005.Google Scholar
35.Cavalli-Sforza, Luca, Menozzi, Paolo, and Piazza, Alberto, The History and Geography of Human Genes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).Google Scholar
36.Alesina, and Ferrara, La, “Ethnic diversity and economic performance,” p. 790–791.Google Scholar
37.Ibid., p. 790.Google Scholar
38.Whitmeyer, “Endogamy as a basis for ethnic behavior.”Google Scholar