Deborah Mathieu's proposal for state intervention in the lives of pregnant substance abusers in order to prevent serious harm to their future children sparked a lively debate in this journal. The present discussion characterizes the three main arguments offered against her proposal as (a) the “uncertainty principle''—the inability to predict which fetuses will be affected, (b) the “father factor”—gender bias with respect to prenatal damage, and (c) “critical periods”—the vulnerability of the embryo/fetus at different times of pregnancy. Each of these arguments is examined in the specific context of fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Since the birth of a child with FAS is a virtual certainty if a woman has previously given birth to a child with FAS, since no father has ever sired a child with FAS unless his spouse is an alcoholic, and since the most damaging effects are those associated with exposure throughout and especially late in pregnancy, none of the arguments offered against Mathieu's proposal are relevant in this particularly narrow set of circumstances. While Mathieu's proposal seems pertinent in this situation, her proposal would be even more effective if modified as suggested here.

Although the threat of chemical and biological warfare has grown, the actual use of poisons as weapons of war or terrorism remains rare. The reason rests in part on a long-standing taboo about poison weapons. This article explores possible biological and cultural explanations for the taboo; surveys the use of poisons by other species, by tribal groups, and by ancient societies; and considers the importance of snakes in developing attitudes about poisons. Reluctance to use poison weapons may have had its origin in the linkage of medicine, poisons, and mysticism common in societies everywhere. Whatever the reasons, however, antipathy to poison weapons is deep-seated, and most nations have embraced the norm that deems these weapons morally repugnant. Policies should be sought that enhance this attitude and therefore make the use of such weapons less likely.

Discussions of democratic involvement in science and technology are often marred by lack of clarity and consequent misunderstanding. In an effort to move beyond the bickering of the “science wars,” I outline several dimensions across which it is possible to distinguish cases of democratized science. In addition, I provide evidence from varied cases, which suggests that the inability of laypeople to grasp the subtle content, difficult concepts, and methodological complexity of science is not a valid basis for a priori rejection of efforts to democratize science. I suggest that the real obstacles to the democratization of science are rooted in widespread social and economic inequalities and an unexamined commitment to expert authority, and I provide some rudimentary proposals for overcoming these hurdles.

A 1995 survey of 1,257 scientists working in the field of recombinant DNA research indicates wide areas of agreement as well as some noteworthy divisions when it comes to such thorny questions as patenting, germ-line research, food labeling, and biodiversity. In general, the scientists surveyed approve of patenting living organisms that result from rDNA research, but vary significantly on what should be patentable. They advocate human germ-line therapy, yet have reservations about using it for any but serious diseases. They oppose mandatory labeling of biologically engineered food products, but understand that the public has a right to know and advocate openness. Finally, they favor development of genetically modified crops, but recognize potential threats to biodiversity and maintain that publicly funded researchers should be legally obligated to consider the potential environmental effects of their research. Some clear differences arise between scientists working in industry and those in academia and between men and women.

There is substantial evidence that intolerance arises from perceptions of difference. A prevailing view holds that even if intolerance is understandable as a defense mechanism, or as an attitude intended to ward off threatening groups and noxious activities, it often is the result of human irrationality and indulgence of prejudice. This conclusion is supported by studies that seem to demonstrate the apparent irrelevance of the actual level of threat to levels of intolerance. These studies show human actions attendant to diversity are caused by established convictions (i.e., prejudice) rather than by the degree of threat. However, informed by theoretical approaches provided by neuroscientists, we report findings that threat is, indeed, a provocative factor that modifies political tolerance in predictable ways. Previous studies defined threat as probabilistic assessments of the likelihood of bad events. When threat is defined as novelty and normative violations (i.e., as departures from expected, or normal, occurrence), then consistent relationships to intolerance are obtained.

It is commonly hoped that technological innovation will sustain development and obviate the need for extensive socioeconomic change. Historically, free markets have increased the quantity of technological innovation, which has in turn enhanced economic growth. This article shows that market selection probably will not produce the technological innovation required to sustain development. Social structures and habitual practices also inhibit technological change, and market choices of technology could prevent ecologically efficient technological innovations. Only political direction of science and technology will optimize the contribution of technology to sustainable development. However, there is no theory or experience to act as a guide to policymaking. In addition, in the medium to long term, technology is indeterminate, selected by local process perturbations. This article suggests some policy directions for science and technology and argues that models borrowed from the life sciences may permit more effective government direction of the technology system.

The Ad Hoc Group established in 1994 to draft proposals to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention through a legally binding instrument has now met twelve times. Its negotiations successfully transitioned in July 1997 to consideration of a draft protocol, the sixth version of which has now been produced. Five meetings totalling sixteen weeks are agreed for 1999, and there is clear global political will to complete the negotiations. All the essential elements for the protocol are now in the rolling text—mandatory declarations, visits (both focused and random), and compliance concern investigations, together with measures to strengthen the implementation of Article X (cooperation for peaceful purposes) and other articles of the BTWC. This article examines how the integrated regime has a considerable synergistic effect that will, over time, build confidence in compliance with the convention; ensure that uncertainties, anomalies, and concerns are swiftly investigated; and improve the implementation of the convention.