² Great Britain failed to secure the opening of Port Arthur to the world, tut Talien-wan was made an open port. On January 17, 1898, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, had declared emphatically in a public speech that the door must not be closed in China. He said that the British government did “not regard China as a place of conquest or acquisition by any European or other power,” and that it was “absolutely determined at whatever cost, even—and I wish to speak plainly—if necessary at the cost of war, that that door shall not be shut.” See London Times for January 18, 1898. In a communication to Sir N. O'Conor, dated March 28, 1898, Lord Salisbury said, “Speaking generally, it may be said that the policy of this country is effectively to open China to the commerce of the world and that our estimate of the action of other powers an the Far East depends on the degree to which it promotes or hinders the attainment of this object. It follows from this that the occupation of territory by foreign powers is to be judged by the results, direct and indirect, immediate and remote, which it is likely to have on the commercial interests of the world, and the right of all nations to trade within the limits of the Chinese Empire on equal terms.” Parliamentary Blue Book on China, No. 1 (1898) , No. 133.

³ China, No. 1 (1899), Nos. 35, 49, 79, 81, 107, etc.

⁴ For the text of the Anglo-Russian agreement, see China, No. 2 (1899) , No. 138.

⁵ For this agreement and the correspondence relating to it, see China, No. 5 (1900), No. I.

⁶ In 1898–99 China, or rather British interests in China, had found a strong champion in Lord Beresford who published the results of his investigation and observations in China in 1899. His work, whilch appears to have been widely read, bore the significant title of “The Break-up of China.” Lord Beresford's mission, which was of an essentially commercial character, was however, not an official one.

⁷ See House Doc. (Foreign Relations, 1899), 56th Congress, first session, pp. 131 ff.

⁸ The reply of Russia had not been without a significant reservation-“As to the ports now opened, or hereafter to be opened to foreign commerce by the Chinese Goverinment, and which lie beyond the territory leased to Russia, the settlement of the question of customs duties belongs to China herself, and the Imperial Government (of Russia) has no intention whatever of claiming any privileges for its own subjects to the exclusion of other foreigners.” But “in so far as the territory .leased by China to Russia is concerned, the Imperial Government (of Russia) has already demonstrated its firm intention to follow the policy of the ‘open door’ by creating Dalny (Ta-lien wan) a free port; and if at some future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be separated by a custom-limit from other portions of the territory in question, the custom duties would be levied, in the zone subject to the tariff, upon all foreign merchandise without distinction as to nationality.” All the powers except Italy made their assent to the desired declarations conditional upon a similar assent on the part of all the other interested powers. The reply of Great Britain was the most explicit and comprehensive, for she specifically included “the leased territory of Wei-hai-Wei and all territory in China which may hereafter be acquired by Great Britain by lease or otherwise, and all spheres of interest now held or that may hereafter be held in China.” See House Doe., cited above.

⁹ Blue Book on China, No. 2 (1900) No. 1. Cf. House Doc. cited above.

¹⁰ See China, No. 1 (1901), No. 256. Cf. House Doc. of 56th Congress, 2nd session (Foreign Rel. 1900) pp. 304 f.

¹¹ The italics are the author's.

¹² So, e. g., in July, 1900, the British and American admirals voted against the proposal to give Russia the control of the railway line from Tongku to Tientsin which the Russians had siezed and were operating in spite of the fact that it was mortgaged to British bond holders. On the strength of the decision of the Admirals, the Russians claimed the whole railway from Taku to Peking. Russian and British troops almost came to an open conflict at one stage of this dispute. See Blue Book on China, No. 7 (1901), passim, especially No. 4.

The United States was particularly active in securing a reduction of the amount of the indemnity imposed upon China. The United States and Great Britain both strongly opposed the Russo-French proposal of a joint guaranteed loan. See China, No. 1 (1902) passim, especially Nos. 136 and 173.

On the other hand the United States, Russia, and Japan opposed the extreme demands of England and Germany on the Chinese Government in the matter of the capital punishment of Prince Tuan, Duke Lan, and Tung-fu Hsiang. See China, No. 6, (1901) passim, especially Nos. 55, 57, 67, 83, 119, 135, 141, 172, 193, 20s and 233.

¹³ The policy of Japan appears at this time to have been much less aggressive than it was a few years later. Inasmuch as Japan furnished more than her proportion of troops for the relief of the Legations at Peking during the Boxer uprising, her government asked for and received financial assistance from England. See China, No. 3 (1900), Nos. 265 ff.

¹⁴ On March 15, 1901, the German Chancellor openly declared in a speech in the Reichstag that “there were no German interests of importance in Manchuria,” and that “the fate of that province was a matter of absolute indifference to Germany.” But he added that Germany had informed China that “she would deprecate the conclusion at the present time of any agreement with no matter which power, which would impair China's financial resources.” Cited by McCarthy, , The Coming Power, p. 105 Google Scholar. Cf. Scott to Lansdowne in China, No. 6 (1901), No. 211. Of course Germany would have demanded concessions elsewhere in China in return for her complaisance toward Russia in Manchuria. The relations between Russia and France during this period are too well-known to admit of any doubt as to the attitude of France.

¹⁵ China, No. 2 (1904), No. 19. See also Nos. 8 and 15 for the attitude of Great Britain and Japan. Germany also made representations to China on this occasion, but with greater reservation and in somewhat different language. See China, op. cit., Nos. 12 and 13.

¹⁶ China, No. 6, (1901), Nos. 202 and 207. See also China, No. 2 (1904) Nos. 16, 21, 24, 28, 34, etc. The United States does not seem to have remonstrated on this occasion. At least such action does not appear in the published documents. She probably considered her former representations sufficient for the purpose.

¹⁷ Asakawa (The Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 194) calls attention to this fact.

¹⁸ The attitude of the British Government was clearly .indicated in a conversation between Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Choate on February 11, 1902. See Mr. Choate to Mr. Hay in House Doc. of 57th Congress, 2nd session, (For. Rel. 1902-3), pp. 511-512.

¹⁹ Paraphrase of telegram to Mr. Conger on February 11, 1902. See House Doc. of 57th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. 1, pp. 275-76. Cf. Ibid., pp. 926-28. Count Laimsdorff's reply to this note is very interesting and significant. He reminded Secretary Hay of the fact that “negotiations carried on between two entirely independent states are not subject to be submitted to the approval of other powers.” He gave the assurance that Russia had “no thought of attacking the principle of the ‘open door’ as that principle is understood by the Imperial Government of Russia,” and that Russia had “no intention whatever to change the policy followed by her in that respect up to the present time. If the Russo-Chinese Bank should obtain concessions in China, the agreements of a private character relating to them would not differ from those heretofore concluded by so many other foreign corporations. . It is impossible to deny to an independent state the right to grant to others such concessions as it is free to dispose of and I have every reason to believe that the demands of the Russo-Chinese Bank do not in the least exceed those that have been so often formulated by other foreign companies, and I feel that under the circumstances it would not be easy for the Imperial Government to deny to Russian companies that support which is given by other Governments to companies and syndicates of their own nationalities.” Ibid., p. 929.

²⁰ Lord Lansdowne to SirMacDonald, Claude The British Parliatnentory Papers for Japan, No. 1, (1902)Google Scholar.

²¹ The United States Government officially disclaimed all knowledge of the negotiations between Great Britain and Japan leading up to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement; but in a memorandum, dated March 22, 1902, it expressed its gratification in seeing in the Russo-French Declaration of March 16, 1902, as also in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, “renewed confirmation of the assurances it has heretofore received from each of them regarding their concurrence with the views which this government has from the outset announced and advocated in respect to the conservation of the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire as well as of Korea, and the maintenance of complete liberty of intercourse between those countries and all nations in matters of trade and industry.” See Mouse Doc. of 57th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 930, 931.

²² The italics are the author's. For the French text and the English translation of this Convention see Book, Blue on China, No. 2, (1904)Google Scholar. Nos. 54 and 51. At the same time Mr. Lessar handed to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries a note in which he declared that “if the Chinese Government, in spite of their positive assurances, should, on any pretext, violate the above conditions, the Imperial Government [of Russia] would no longer consider themselves bound by the provisions of the Manchurian agreement, nor by its declarations on this subject, and would have to decline to take all responsibility for all the consequences which might ensue.” See China, cited above, No. 51, inclosure, p. 38.

²³ By October 8, 1902, at the end of the first six months, Russia had withdrawn her troops from the southwestern portion of the Sheng-King or Mukden province as far as the Liao river. Her pretended evacuation of the remainder of the Mukden province, including Mukden itself, appears to have been a mere farce or sham. See Asakawa, op. cit., p. 239. There was not even a pretence at evacuation in the case of Niu-Chwang from which Russia had repeatedly promised to withdraw her troops.

²⁴ For the most authentic text of these demands published in England,, see China, No. 2 (1904), No. 94. For the original Russian note sent by M. Plancon to Prince Ching, see House Doc. of 58th Cong., 2nd session. Vol. 1 (Foreign Rel.) pp. 56-58. In his interview of April 28, 1903, with Mr. McCormick, the American ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Lamsdorff denied in the most positive terms that such demand's were made by the Russian Government, but the denial of Count Lamsdorff was partly offset by the admissions of Count Cassini in his remarkable interview published in the New York Tribune for May 1, 1903, cited by Asakawa, p. 249.

²⁵ China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 79 ff. In a communication, dated April 28, 1903, to Sir M. Herbert, Lord Lansdowne said it was the “desire and intention” of the British Government “to act in accordance with what we conceive to be the policy of the United States, namely, to open China impartially to the commerce of the whole world, to maintain her independence and integrity, and to insist upon the fulfilment of treaty and other obligations by the Chinese Government which they have contracted towards us.” Ibid. No. 90.

²⁶ On the same day (October 8, 1903) there was also concluded a commercial treaty, providing for the opening to the world's trade of Mukden and Tatung-Kao, between China and Japan. On September 6, 1903, Russia had made six fresh demand's on China. One of these demands implied that no foreign settlements or concessions to foreigners were in the future to be granted in Manchuria. These demands were rejected by the Chinese Government at the instigation of the British and Japanese Ministers at Peking. See China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 147 ff., especially No. 156.

The attitude of Russia towards the rights and privileges of foreigners in Manchuria may be inferred from Count Benckendorff's admissions to Lord Lansdowne on July 11, 1903. He said in effect that “the Imperial Government [of Russia] have no intention of opposing the gradual opening by China, as commercial relations develop, of some towns in Manchuria to foreign commerce, excluding, however, the right to establish ‘Settlements’ China, No. 2 (1904), No. 133.

²⁷ House Doc. of 58th Congress, 3d session (For. Rel, 1904), p. 2.