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Remarks by Benedict Kingsbury

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2017

Benedict Kingsbury*
Affiliation:
Duke University School of Law

Abstract

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Type
Theme Plenary Session: Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1997

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References

1 See Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (1989); Oran Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (1994).

2 Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missle Crisis: International Crises and the Role of Law (1974).

3 Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich & Andreas Lowenfeld, International Legal Process (1968-1969).

4 Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Regimes (1995).

5 A preliminary summary of findings is Jacobson, Harold & Weiss, Edith Brown, Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative Project, 1 Global Governance 119-48 (1995)Google Scholar.

6 George Downs & David Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races and Arms Control (1990); George Downs & David Rocke, Optimal Imperfection?: Institutions and Domestic Politics in International Relations (1995); Downs, George, Rocke, David & Barsoom, Peter, Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379-406 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.